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183   $acr
200 10$aMore than you wanted to know $ethe failure of mandated disclosure /$fOmri Ben-Shahar, Carl E. Schneider
205   $aCourse Book
210  1$aPrinceton, New Jersey :$cPrinceton University Press,$d2014.
210  4$dİ2014
215   $a1 online resource (244 p.)
300   $aIncludes index.
311 0 $a0-691-17088-6 
311 0 $a0-691-16170-4 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 197-223) and index.
327   $tFront matter --$tContents --$tPreface --$tPart I. The Ubiquity of Mandated Disclosure --$t1. Introduction --$t2. Complex Decisions, Complex Disclosures --$t3. The Failure of Mandated Disclosure --$tPart II. Why Disclosures Fail --$t4. "Whatever": The Psychology of Mandated Disclosure --$t5. Reading Disclosures --$t6. The Quantity Question --$t7. From Disclosure to Decision --$tPart III. Can Mandated Disclosure Be Saved? --$t8. Make It Simple? --$t9. The Politics of Disclosure --$t10. Producing Disclosures --$t11. At Worst, Harmless? --$t12. Conclusion: Beyond Disclosurism --$tNotes --$tIndex
330   $aPerhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure-requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well. More Than You Wanted to Know surveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative, More Than You Wanted to Know takes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.
606   $aDisclosure of information$xLaw and legislation$zUnited States
606   $aConsumer protection$xLaw and legislation$zUnited States
606   $aDecision making$zUnited States
610   $aMiranda.
610   $aaccumulation problem.
610   $aagents.
610   $aaggregators.
610   $aautonomy.
610   $abehavioral economics.
610   $acomplexity.
610   $aconflict of interest.
610   $aconsultants.
610   $aconsumer law.
610   $aconsumers.
610   $acontracts.
610   $adecision aversion.
610   $adecisions.
610   $adefaults.
610   $adisclosers.
610   $adisclosurism.
610   $adisclosurite psychology.
610   $adisclosurites.
610   $adiscretion.
610   $adoctors.
610   $aempirical studies.
610   $afalse assumptions.
610   $afinancial disclosure.
610   $afinancial literacy.
610   $afine print.
610   $afree market.
610   $ahealth literacy.
610   $aiTunes.
610   $ailliteracy.
610   $ainequality.
610   $ainformation disclosure.
610   $ainformation.
610   $ainformed consent.
610   $ainformed decisions.
610   $ainnumeracy.
610   $ainsurance.
610   $aintermediaries.
610   $alaboratory experiments.
610   $alawmakers.
610   $alawmaking.
610   $alenders.
610   $amandated disclosure.
610   $amarkets.
610   $amedical treatment.
610   $amortgages.
610   $anumeracy.
610   $aopt out.
610   $aoverload problem.
610   $aoverload.
610   $apolice.
610   $apolitics.
610   $aprivacy.
610   $aprostate cancer.
610   $aquantity question.
610   $arationality.
610   $areaders.
610   $areading levels.
610   $areasoning.
610   $aregulation.
610   $aregulators.
610   $aregulatory method.
610   $arules.
610   $asector literacy.
610   $asimplification.
610   $asocial practice.
610   $asocial psychology.
615  0$aDisclosure of information$xLaw and legislation
615  0$aConsumer protection$xLaw and legislation
615  0$aDecision making
676   $a346.7302/1
686   $aPU 5330$2rvk
700   $aBen-Shahar$b Omri$01479664
702   $aSchneider$b Carl E.$f1948-
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910787713703321
996   $aMore than you wanted to know$93695901
997   $aUNINA