Bad beliefs : Why they happen to good people / / Neil Levy
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| Autore: |
Levy Neil
|
| Titolo: |
Bad beliefs : Why they happen to good people / / Neil Levy
|
| Pubblicazione: | New York : , : Oxford University Press, , 2021 |
| ©2021 | |
| Edizione: | First edition. |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (xxii, 188 pages) |
| Disciplina: | 302 |
| Soggetto topico: | Human behavior |
| Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Nota di contenuto: | Front Matter -- Copyright Page -- Acknowledgments -- ExpandPreface: Rational Social Animals Go Wild -- Expand1 What Should We Believe About Belief? -- View chapter -- Expand2 Culturing Belief -- View chapter -- Expand3 How Our Minds Are Made Up -- View chapter -- Expand4 Dare to Think? -- View chapter -- Expand5 Epistemic Pollution -- View chapter -- Expand6 Nudging Well -- View chapter -- Concluding Thoughts: Rational Animals After All -- View chapter -- End Matter -- References -- Index. |
| Sommario/riassunto: | "Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We've missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we've failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging - at least usually - changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn't rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency"-- Provided by publisher. |
| Altri titoli varianti: | Bad beliefs |
| Titolo autorizzato: | Bad Beliefs |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910774705303321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |