LEADER 02684nam 2200385 450 001 9910774705303321 005 20230328213000.0 035 $a(CKB)4100000012897614 035 $a(NjHacI)994100000012897614 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000012897614 100 $a20230328d2021 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aBad beliefs $eWhy they happen to good people /$fNeil Levy 205 $aFirst edition. 210 1$aNew York :$cOxford University Press,$d2021. 210 4$dİ2021 215 $a1 online resource (xxii, 188 pages) 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aFront Matter -- Copyright Page -- Acknowledgments -- ExpandPreface: Rational Social Animals Go Wild -- Expand1 What Should We Believe About Belief? -- View chapter -- Expand2 Culturing Belief -- View chapter -- Expand3 How Our Minds Are Made Up -- View chapter -- Expand4 Dare to Think? -- View chapter -- Expand5 Epistemic Pollution -- View chapter -- Expand6 Nudging Well -- View chapter -- Concluding Thoughts: Rational Animals After All -- View chapter -- End Matter -- References -- Index. 330 $a"Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We've missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we've failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging - at least usually - changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn't rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency"-- Provided by publisher. 517 $aBad beliefs 606 $aHuman behavior 615 0$aHuman behavior. 676 $a302 700 $aLevy$b Neil$0609315 801 0$bNjHacI 801 1$bNjHacl 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910774705303321 996 $aBad Beliefs$92597117 997 $aUNINA