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Autore: | De Palma André |
Titolo: | Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / / André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth |
Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (25 p.) |
Soggetto topico: | Public-private sector cooperation |
Privatization | |
Risk management | |
Infrastructure | |
Macroeconomics | |
Public Finance | |
Organizational Behavior | |
Transaction Costs | |
Property Rights | |
Bureaucracy | |
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations | |
Corruption | |
Asymmetric and Private Information | |
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures | |
Other Public Investment and Capital Stock | |
Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation | |
Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis | |
Public Enterprises | |
Public-Private Enterprises | |
Public Administration | |
Public Sector Accounting and Audits | |
Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General | |
Public finance & taxation | |
Civil service & public sector | |
Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP) | |
Public sector | |
Risks of public-private partnership | |
Transportation | |
Expenditure | |
Economic sectors | |
Public financial management (PFM) | |
National accounts | |
Finance, Public | |
Fiscal policy | |
Saving and investment | |
Soggetto geografico: | United States |
Altri autori: | PrunierGuillaume LeruthLuc |
Note generali: | At head of title: Offices in Europe. |
"August 2009." | |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
Nota di contenuto: | Contents; I. Introduction; II. The development of PPPs; III. Risk sharing, asymmetry of information, and perception biases; A. Asymmetry of information; Tables; 1. A Basic Matrix for Risk-Sharing in PPPs; B. Perception Biases; IV. A principal-agent approach to PPPs; Figures; 1. Perception Biases; 2. The Principal-Agent Framework; V. PPP risks and a typology; 2. Typology of Risks in PPPs; VI. Conclusions; References |
Sommario/riassunto: | There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turining to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered. |
Titolo autorizzato: | Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships |
ISBN: | 1-4623-4164-0 |
1-4527-6015-2 | |
9786612843884 | |
1-4518-7324-7 | |
1-282-84388-5 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910788229103321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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