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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910788229103321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"De Palma André"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / / André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"1-4623-4164-0"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4527-6015-2"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9786612843884"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-4518-7324-7"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1-282-84388-5"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (25 p.)"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Public-private sector cooperation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Privatization"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Risk management"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Infrastructure"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Organizational Behavior"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Transaction Costs"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Property Rights"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Bureaucracy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Administrative Processes in Public Organizations"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Corruption"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Asymmetric and Private Information"]
[{"$nulls":4},"National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Other Public Investment and Capital Stock"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Enterprises"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public-Private Enterprises"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Administration"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Sector Accounting and Audits"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public finance & taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Civil service & public sector"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public sector"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Risks of public-private partnership"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Transportation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Expenditure"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Economic sectors"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public financial management (PFM)"]
[{"$nulls":4},"National accounts"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Finance, Public"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Fiscal policy"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Saving and investment"]
[{"$nulls":4},"United States"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","At head of title: Offices in Europe."]
[{"$nulls":4},"\"August 2009.\""]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,"Nota di contenuto",null,"Contents; I. Introduction; II. The development of PPPs; III. Risk sharing, asymmetry of information, and perception biases; A. Asymmetry of information; Tables; 1. A Basic Matrix for Risk-Sharing in PPPs; B. Perception Biases; IV. A principal-agent approach to PPPs; Figures; 1. Perception Biases; 2. The Principal-Agent Framework; V. PPP risks and a typology; 2. Typology of Risks in PPPs; VI. Conclusions; References"]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turining to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered."]