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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788229103321 |
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Autore |
De Palma André |
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Titolo |
Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / / André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-4164-0 |
1-4527-6015-2 |
9786612843884 |
1-4518-7324-7 |
1-282-84388-5 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (25 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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PrunierGuillaume |
LeruthLuc |
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Soggetti |
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Public-private sector cooperation |
Privatization |
Risk management |
Infrastructure |
Macroeconomics |
Public Finance |
Organizational Behavior |
Transaction Costs |
Property Rights |
Bureaucracy |
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations |
Corruption |
Asymmetric and Private Information |
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures |
Other Public Investment and Capital Stock |
Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation |
Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis |
Public Enterprises |
Public-Private Enterprises |
Public Administration |
Public Sector Accounting and Audits |
Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General |
Public finance & taxation |
Civil service & public sector |
Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP) |
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Public sector |
Risks of public-private partnership |
Transportation |
Expenditure |
Economic sectors |
Public financial management (PFM) |
National accounts |
Finance, Public |
Fiscal policy |
Saving and investment |
United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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At head of title: Offices in Europe. |
"August 2009." |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; I. Introduction; II. The development of PPPs; III. Risk sharing, asymmetry of information, and perception biases; A. Asymmetry of information; Tables; 1. A Basic Matrix for Risk-Sharing in PPPs; B. Perception Biases; IV. A principal-agent approach to PPPs; Figures; 1. Perception Biases; 2. The Principal-Agent Framework; V. PPP risks and a typology; 2. Typology of Risks in PPPs; VI. Conclusions; References |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turining to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered. |
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