Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy / / Tom Krebs, Moritz Kuhn, Mark L. J. Wright

• Autore: Krebs Tom
• Pubblicazione: Cambridge, Mass, : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource : illustrations (black and white)
• Soggetto topico: Incomplete Markets; Consumption • Saving • Wealth; Employment • Unemployment • Wages • Intergenerational Income Distribution • Aggregate Human Capital • Aggregate Labor Productivity; Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity
• Classificazione: D52; E21; E24; J24
• Altri autori: KuhnMoritz WrightMark L. J
• Note generali: December 2011.
• Sommario/riassunto: We develop a macroeconomic model with physical and human capital, human capital risk, and limited contract enforcement. We show analytically that young (high-return) households are the most exposed to human capital risk and are also the least insured. We document this risk-insurance pattern in data on life-insurance drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finance. A calibrated version of the model can quantitatively account for the life-cycle variation of insurance observed in the US data and implies welfare costs of under-insurance for young households that are equivalent to a 4 percent reduction in lifetime consumption. A policy reform that makes consumer bankruptcy more costly leads to a substantial increase in the volume of credit and insurance.
• Titolo autorizzato: Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910133619703321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w17714.