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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910133619703321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Krebs Tom"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy / / Tom Krebs, Moritz Kuhn, Mark L. J. Wright"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Cambridge, Mass, : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource : illustrations (black and white);"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"NBER working paper series ; no. w17714"]
[null,null,"Classificazione",null,"D52"]
[{"$nulls":4},"E21"]
[{"$nulls":4},"E24"]
[{"$nulls":4},"J24"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Incomplete Markets"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Consumption • Saving • Wealth"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Employment • Unemployment • Wages • Intergenerational Income Distribution • Aggregate Human Capital • Aggregate Labor Productivity"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Note generali","December 2011."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","We develop a macroeconomic model with physical and human capital, human capital risk, and limited contract enforcement. We show analytically that young (high-return) households are the most exposed to human capital risk and are also the least insured. We document this risk-insurance pattern in data on life-insurance drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finance. A calibrated version of the model can quantitatively account for the life-cycle variation of insurance observed in the US data and implies welfare costs of under-insurance for young households that are equivalent to a 4 percent reduction in lifetime consumption. A policy reform that makes consumer bankruptcy more costly leads to a substantial increase in the volume of credit and insurance."]