1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910133619703321

Autore

Krebs Tom

Titolo

Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy / / Tom Krebs, Moritz Kuhn, Mark L. J. Wright

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge, Mass, : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource : illustrations (black and white);

Collana

NBER working paper series ; no. w17714

Classificazione

D52

E21

E24

J24

Altri autori (Persone)

KuhnMoritz

WrightMark L. J

Soggetti

Incomplete Markets

Consumption • Saving • Wealth

Employment • Unemployment • Wages • Intergenerational Income Distribution • Aggregate Human Capital • Aggregate Labor Productivity

Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

December 2011.

Sommario/riassunto

We develop a macroeconomic model with physical and human capital, human capital risk, and limited contract enforcement. We show analytically that young (high-return) households are the most exposed to human capital risk and are also the least insured. We document this risk-insurance pattern in data on life-insurance drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finance. A calibrated version of the model can quantitatively account for the life-cycle variation of insurance observed in the US data and implies welfare costs of under-insurance for young households that are equivalent to a 4 percent reduction in lifetime consumption. A policy reform that makes consumer bankruptcy more costly leads to a substantial increase in the volume of credit and insurance.