Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment / / Alan M. Jacobs [[electronic resource]]

• Autore: Jacobs Alan M.
• Pubblicazione: Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2011
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xiv, 306 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
• Disciplina: 331.25/2
• Soggetto topico: Social policy; Social choice; Political planning; Welfare economics; Externalities (Economics) - Political aspects; Pensions - Government policy
• Note generali: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Machine generated contents note: Part I. Problem and Theory: 1. The politics of when; 2. Theorizing intertemporal policy choice; Part II. Programmatic Origins: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Design: 3. Investing in the state: the origins of German pensions, 1889; 4. The politics of mistrust: the origins of British pensions, 1925; 5. Investments as political constraint: the origins of US pensions, 1935; 6. Investing for the short term: the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965; Part III. Programmatic Change: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Reform: 7. Investment as last resort: reforming US pensions, 1977 and 1983; 8. Shifting the long-run burden: reforming British pensions, 1986; 9. Committing to investment: reforming Canadian pensions, 1998; 10. Constrained by uncertainty: reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001; Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Understanding the politics of the long term.
• Sommario/riassunto: In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking.
• Titolo autorizzato: Governing for the long term
• ISBN: 1-107-21459-9; 1-139-06314-6; 1-283-11093-8; 9786613110930; 1-139-07539-X; 0-511-92176-4; 1-139-07994-8; 1-139-07765-1; 1-139-06963-2; 1-139-08221-3
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910461468403321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II