04126nam 22007572 450 991046146840332120151005020622.01-107-21459-91-139-06314-61-283-11093-897866131109301-139-07539-X0-511-92176-41-139-07994-81-139-07765-11-139-06963-21-139-08221-3(CKB)2670000000088884(EBL)691877(OCoLC)726734769(SSID)ssj0000522982(PQKBManifestationID)11376282(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000522982(PQKBWorkID)10539828(PQKB)11376004(UkCbUP)CR9780511921766(MiAaPQ)EBC691877(Au-PeEL)EBL691877(CaPaEBR)ebr10470675(CaONFJC)MIL311093(EXLCZ)99267000000008888420100927d2011|||| uy| 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierGoverning for the long term democracy and the politics of investment /Alan M. Jacobs[electronic resource]Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2011.1 online resource (xiv, 306 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).0-521-17177-6 0-521-19585-3 Includes bibliographical references and index.Machine generated contents note: Part I. Problem and Theory: 1. The politics of when; 2. Theorizing intertemporal policy choice; Part II. Programmatic Origins: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Design: 3. Investing in the state: the origins of German pensions, 1889; 4. The politics of mistrust: the origins of British pensions, 1925; 5. Investments as political constraint: the origins of US pensions, 1935; 6. Investing for the short term: the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965; Part III. Programmatic Change: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Reform: 7. Investment as last resort: reforming US pensions, 1977 and 1983; 8. Shifting the long-run burden: reforming British pensions, 1986; 9. Committing to investment: reforming Canadian pensions, 1998; 10. Constrained by uncertainty: reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001; Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Understanding the politics of the long term.In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking.Social policySocial choicePolitical planningWelfare economicsExternalities (Economics)Political aspectsPensionsGovernment policyCase studiesSocial policy.Social choice.Political planning.Welfare economics.Externalities (Economics)Political aspects.PensionsGovernment policy331.25/2Jacobs Alan M.52204UkCbUPUkCbUPBOOK9910461468403321Governing for the long term1897013UNINA