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010   $a9786613110930
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101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aGoverning for the long term $edemocracy and the politics of investment /$fAlan M. Jacobs$b[electronic resource]
210  1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2011.
215   $a1 online resource (xiv, 306 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-17177-6 
311   $a0-521-19585-3 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $aMachine generated contents note: Part I. Problem and Theory: 1. The politics of when; 2. Theorizing intertemporal policy choice; Part II. Programmatic Origins: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Design: 3. Investing in the state: the origins of German pensions, 1889; 4. The politics of mistrust: the origins of British pensions, 1925; 5. Investments as political constraint: the origins of US pensions, 1935; 6. Investing for the short term: the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965; Part III. Programmatic Change: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Reform: 7. Investment as last resort: reforming US pensions, 1977 and 1983; 8. Shifting the long-run burden: reforming British pensions, 1986; 9. Committing to investment: reforming Canadian pensions, 1998; 10. Constrained by uncertainty: reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001; Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Understanding the politics of the long term.
330   $aIn Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking.
606   $aSocial policy
606   $aSocial choice
606   $aPolitical planning
606   $aWelfare economics
606   $aExternalities (Economics)$xPolitical aspects
606   $aPensions$xGovernment policy$vCase studies
615  0$aSocial policy.
615  0$aSocial choice.
615  0$aPolitical planning.
615  0$aWelfare economics.
615  0$aExternalities (Economics)$xPolitical aspects.
615  0$aPensions$xGovernment policy
676   $a331.25/2
700   $aJacobs$b Alan M.$052204
801  0$bUkCbUP
801  1$bUkCbUP
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910461468403321
996   $aGoverning for the long term$91897013
997   $aUNINA