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Titolo: |
Modes of existence : papers in ontology and philosophical logic / / Andrea Bottani, Richard Davies (eds.)
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Pubblicazione: | Frankfurt ; ; New Brunswick, : Ontos Verlag, 2006 |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (238 p.) |
Disciplina: | 111 |
Soggetto topico: | Ontology |
Logic | |
Altri autori: |
BottaniAndrea
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Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
Nota di contenuto: | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Introduction -- Facts, Formal Objects and Ontology / Mulligan, Kevin -- Fictional and Aesthetic Objects: Meinong's Point of View / Raspa, Venanzio -- Russell's Descriptions and Meinong's Assumptions / Kroon, Frederick -- McGinn on Existence / Inwagen, Peter van -- The Talk I Was Supposed to Give / Varzi, Achille C. -- Two Interpretations of "According to a Story" / Reicher, Maria E. -- Madame Bovary as a Higher-Order Object / Barbero, Carola -- Identity across Time and Stories / Orilia, Francesco -- A Problem about Reference in Fiction / Spolaore, Giuseppe -- Backmatter |
Sommario/riassunto: | The volume collects essays by an international team of philosophers aimed at elucidating three fundamental and interconnected themes in ontology. In the first instance, there is the issue of the kind of thing that, in the primary sense, is or exists: must the primitive terms be particular or universal? Any reply will itself raise the question of how to treat discourse that appears to refer to things that cannot be met with in time and space: what difference is there between saying that someone is not sad and saying that something does not exist? If we can speak meaningfully about fictions, wha |
Titolo autorizzato: | Modes of existence ![]() |
ISBN: | 3-11-032753-8 |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910810098303321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |