Vai al contenuto principale della pagina

Kant's defense of common moral experience : a phenomenological account / / Jeanine Grenberg [[electronic resource]]



(Visualizza in formato marc)    (Visualizza in BIBFRAME)

Autore: Grenberg Jeanine Visualizza persona
Titolo: Kant's defense of common moral experience : a phenomenological account / / Jeanine Grenberg [[electronic resource]] Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2013
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xi, 300 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
Disciplina: 170.92
Soggetto topico: Ethics
Phenomenology
Practical reason
Note generali: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto: pt. I The Interpretive Framework -- 1. Kant's common, phenomenological grounding of morality -- 2. Response to immediate objections: experience -- 3. Response to immediate objections: feeling -- pt. II The "Groundwork" -- 4. Kant's Groundwork rejection of a reliable experience of categorical obligation -- 5. The phenomenological failure of Groundwork III -- pt. III The "Critique Of Practical Reason" -- 6. Recent interpretations of the Fact of Reason -- 7. The Gallows Man: the new face of attentiveness -- 8. The Fact of Reason is a forced phenomenological fact -- 9. The Gallows Man's fact is the Fact of Reason -- 10. Thoughts on the deduction of freedom -- 11. Objective, synthetic, a priori, practical cognitions.
Sommario/riassunto: In this book, Jeanine Grenberg argues that everything important about Kant's moral philosophy emerges from careful reflection upon the common human moral experience of the conflict between happiness and morality. Through careful readings of both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Grenberg shows that Kant, typically thought to be an overly technical moral philosopher, in fact is a vigorous defender of the common person's first-personal encounter with moral demands. Grenberg uncovers a notion of phenomenological experience in Kant's account of the Fact of Reason, develops a new a reading of the Fact, and grants a moral epistemic role for feeling in grounding Kant's a priori morality. The book thus challenges readings which attribute only a motivational role to feeling; and Fichtean readings which violate Kant's commitments to the limits of reason. This study will be valuable to students and scholars engaged in Kant studies.
Titolo autorizzato: Kant's defense of common moral experience  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-139-89149-9
1-107-27258-0
1-107-27197-5
1-107-54125-5
1-107-27855-4
1-139-52012-1
1-107-27406-0
1-107-27530-X
1-107-27732-9
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910807736003321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Serie: Modern European philosophy.