Kant's defense of common moral experience : a phenomenological account / / Jeanine Grenberg [[electronic resource]]

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910807736003321
• Autore: Grenberg Jeanine
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2013
• ISBN: 1-139-89149-9; 1-107-27258-0; 1-107-27197-5; 1-107-54125-5; 1-107-27855-4; 1-139-52012-1; 1-107-27406-0; 1-107-27530-X; 1-107-27732-9
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xi, 300 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
• Collana: Modern European philosophy
• Disciplina: 170.92
• Soggetti: Ethics; Phenomenology; Practical reason
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: pt. I The Interpretive Framework -- 1. Kant's common, phenomenological grounding of morality -- 2. Response to immediate objections: experience -- 3. Response to immediate objections: feeling -- pt. II The "Groundwork" -- 4. Kant's Groundwork rejection of a reliable experience of categorical obligation -- 5. The phenomenological failure of Groundwork III -- pt. III The "Critique Of Practical Reason" -- 6. Recent interpretations of the Fact of Reason -- 7. The Gallows Man: the new face of attentiveness -- 8. The Fact of Reason is a forced phenomenological fact -- 9. The Gallows Man's fact is the Fact of Reason -- 10. Thoughts on the deduction of freedom -- 11. Objective, synthetic, a priori, practical cognitions.
• Sommario/riassunto: In this book, Jeanine Grenberg argues that everything important about ; Kant's moral philosophy emerges from careful reflection upon the common human moral experience of the conflict between happiness and morality. Through careful readings of both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Grenberg shows that Kant, typically thought to be an overly technical moral philosopher, in fact is a vigorous defender of the common person's first-personal encounter with moral demands. Grenberg uncovers a notion of phenomenological experience in Kant's account of the Fact of Reason, develops a new a reading of the Fact, and grants a moral epistemic role for feeling in grounding Kant's a priori morality. The book thus challenges readings which attribute only a motivational role to feeling; and Fichtean readings which violate Kant's commitments to the limits of reason. This study will be valuable to students and scholars engaged in Kant studies.