| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- References -- Part I Theoretical and Behavioral Foundations -- 2 Commitment Tactics in Bargaining Under Complete Information -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Theoretical Literature -- 2.2.1 Stochastic Success and Inefficiency -- 2.2.2 Models with Deterministic Success -- 2.2.2.1 Applied Models of Delegation -- 2.2.2.2 Pre-commitment -- 2.3 Relevance and Future -- 2.3.1 Experiments -- 2.3.2 Field Evidence -- 2.3.3 Steps Forward -- References -- 3 Reputational Bargaining -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Abreu-Gul (AG) Reputational Bargaining Model -- 3.2.1 The Concession Game with a Single Commitment Type -- 3.2.2 The Concession Game with Multiple Commitment Types -- 3.2.3 Convergence of Discrete-Time Bargaining to the Concession Game -- 3.3 Extensions -- 3.3.1 Endogenous Commitment Demands -- 3.3.2 Nonstationary Types and Payoffs-as-You-Go -- 3.3.3 Nonequilibrium Analysis -- 3.3.4 Nonstationary Environments -- 3.3.5 Incomplete Information About Preferences -- 3.4 Applications -- 3.4.1 Outside Options and Search Markets -- 3.4.2 Mediation -- 3.5 Experimental Evidence -- 3.6 Open Questions -- 3.6.1 Foundations for Commitment Behavior -- 3.6.2 Other Directions -- References -- 4 Dynamic Bargaining with Private Information -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Dynamic Bargaining with (Endogenously) Interdependent Values -- 4.2.1 Revisiting the "Classic" Coase Conjecture -- 4.2.2 Exogenously Interdependent Values -- 4.2.3 Endogenously Interdependent Values: Bargaining with Arrivals -- 4.2.4 Endogenously Interdependent Values: Bargaining with Deadlines -- 4.3 Privacy in Bargaining and Endogenous Entry -- 4.3.1 Bargaining in the Presence of Outsiders -- 4.3.2 Effect of Privacy of Offers with a Sequence of Traders -- 4.4 Avenues for Future Research -- References.
5 Reference Dependence in Bargaining Models -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Reference Dependence in Cooperative Bargaining Models -- 5.3 Reference Dependence in Non-cooperative Bargaining Models -- 5.4 Discussion -- References -- 6 Focal Points in Experimental Bargaining Games -- 6.1 Focal Points in Bargaining -- 6.2 Bargaining with Payoff-Based Focal Points -- 6.2.1 Equality as Focal Point -- 6.2.2 Efficiency as Focal Point -- 6.3 Bargaining with Label-Based Focal Points -- 6.3.1 Player Labels as Focal Points -- 6.3.2 Strategy Labels as Focal Points -- 6.3.2.1 Tacit Bargaining Games Framed as Matching Games -- 6.3.2.2 The Bargaining Table Design -- 6.3.2.3 Other Applications of the Bargaining Table Design -- 6.4 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- 7 Between Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism: Some Ethical Aspects of the Nash Bargaining Solution -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Preliminaries -- 7.2.1 Axioms -- 7.3 Shapley's Result -- 7.4 Bounds -- 7.5 Suppes-Sen Dominance and Mariotti's Result -- 7.6 Midpoint Domination -- 7.7 Indivisible Goods -- 7.8 "Utility Production" and the Nash Product -- 7.9 A Probabilistic View on Bargaining -- 7.10 Conclusion -- References -- 8 Dynamic Legislative Bargaining -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 General Framework -- 8.3 Existence of Equilibria -- 8.4 Distributive Policy -- 8.5 Spatial Policy -- 8.6 Efficiency -- 8.7 Open Questions -- References -- Part II Applications -- 9 Legislative Bargaining Experiments -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Methodology of Laboratory Experiments -- 9.3 Ad hoc Committees -- 9.3.1 Overview of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) Model -- 9.3.2 Bargaining Protocol -- 9.3.3 Voting Rules and Continuation Values -- 9.3.4 Voting Power -- 9.3.5 Communication -- 9.3.6 Bargaining with Public Goods and Public Policy -- 9.3.7 Bargaining over Endogenous Budgets -- 9.3.8 Effect of Malapportionment.
9.4 Standing Committees -- 9.4.1 Dynamic Bargaining with Endogenous Status quo -- 9.4.2 The Effects of Communication -- 9.4.3 Veto Power -- 9.4.4 Public Good Accumulation -- 9.4.5 Agenda Setting Rules -- 9.5 Future Directions -- References -- 10 Market Institutions, Prices and Distribution of Surplus: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Theory and Experiment -- 10.2.1 Theoretical Predictions -- 10.2.2 Experimental Design and Hypotheses -- 10.2.3 Experimental Procedures -- 10.3 Results -- 10.3.1 Observed Bargaining Behaviour -- 10.3.2 Observed Auction Behaviour -- 10.4 Discussion -- References -- 11 Empirical Models of Bargaining with Externalities in IO and Trade -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Bargaining Equilibrium -- 11.3 Estimation -- 11.4 Empirical Applications -- 11.4.1 Media Content and Distribution -- 11.4.2 Health Care -- 11.4.3 Groceries -- 11.4.4 Other Sectors -- 11.4.5 Tariff Determination in International Trade -- 11.5 Conclusion and New Directions -- References -- 12 Bargaining in Healthcare Markets: Applications of Nash-in-Nash and Extensions -- 12.1 Bargaining in Healthcare, Upstream, and Downstream -- 12.1.1 Applications to Buyer Power: Purchasing of Medical Devices, Pharmaceuticals, and Hospital Care -- 12.1.2 Applications to Supplier Market Power: Mergers and Hospital-Insurer Bargaining -- 12.2 Modeling Network Formation -- 12.2.1 Strategic Exclusion -- 12.2.1.1 Selection on networks -- 12.2.1.2 Quality regulation -- 12.2.2 Frictions in network formation -- 12.3 New Directions: Contracts, Organizations, and Information -- 12.3.1 Enhancing the Contracting Space -- 12.3.2 Asymmetric Information Bargaining -- 12.4 Discussion: Progress and Opportunities for Bargaining in Healthcare and Beyond -- References -- 13 Bargaining and Climate Change Negotiations -- 13.1 Introduction.
13.2 Modeling the Kyoto world -- 13.2.1 The Basic Model -- 13.2.2 Variations on a Theme -- 13.2.2.1 The Role of a Leader -- 13.2.2.2 Features of International Negotiations -- 13.2.2.3 Future Binding Negotiations -- 13.2.2.4 Asymmetry of Information -- 13.3 The Paris Agreement Arrives, New Models Are Needed -- 13.4 Conclusion -- References -- 14 Bargaining and War -- 14.1 Crisis Bargaining -- 14.2 The Basic Framework and Fearon's Rationalist Accounts of War -- 14.3 Informational Problems -- 14.3.1 Dynamic Bargaining -- 14.3.2 Bargaining Power -- 14.3.3 Robust Predictions: Mechanism Design Approach -- 14.3.4 Resolution of Informational Problems -- 14.4 Commitment Problems -- 14.4.1 Lack of Commitment to Future Redistribution -- 14.4.2 Shift of Power and Persistent Fighting -- 14.4.3 Robust Predictions: A Unifying Approach -- 14.4.4 Resolution of Commitment Problems -- 14.5 Discussion and Future Directions -- References -- 15 Bargaining in Operations Management Research -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 Features of Bargaining Research in OM -- 15.3 Ultimatum Offers -- 15.3.1 Full Information -- 15.3.2 Asymmetric information -- 15.4 Unstructured Bargaining -- 15.4.1 Full Information -- 15.4.2 Asymmetric information -- 15.5 Established Results and Future Directions -- 15.5.1 Established Results -- 15.5.2 Future Directions -- References -- Part III Advances in Bargaining Research: New Platforms, Challenges and Techniques -- 16 Field Experiments in Bargaining -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 Discrimination in the Marketplace -- 16.3 Bargaining Within the Household -- 16.4 Gender and Bargaining -- 16.5 Role of Culture and Ethnicity -- 16.6 Efficiency and Welfare -- 16.7 Discussion and Possible Directions for Future Research -- References -- 17 Bargaining in Online Markets -- 17.1 eBay's Best Offer Platform -- 17.2 Cheap-Talk Signaling and Bargaining.
17.3 Protocol Design: Communication and Bargaining Breakdown -- 17.4 New Tools and Directions -- References -- 18 Self-sufficient, Self-directed, and Interdependent Negotiation Systems: A Roadmap Toward Autonomous Negotiation Agents -- 18.1 Introduction -- 18.2 The Autonomy Diagonal of Negotiation -- 18.2.1 Negotiation Support Systems -- 18.2.2 Game Theoretical Approaches and Trading Bots -- 18.2.3 Negotiation Analytical Approaches -- 18.3 Major Challenges -- 18.3.1 Domain Knowledge and Preference Elicitation -- 18.3.1.1 Preference Elicitation on-the-Fly -- 18.3.1.2 Domain Modeling -- 18.3.2 Long-Term Perspective -- 18.3.2.1 Repeated Encounters -- 18.3.2.2 Non-Stationary Preferences -- 18.3.3 User Trust and Adoption -- 18.3.3.1 User Participation -- 18.3.3.2 Transparent Consequences -- 18.4 Concluding Observations -- References -- 19 Using Machine Learning to Understand Bargaining Experiments -- 19.1 Introduction -- 19.1.1 A brief history of bargaining experiments -- 19.1.2 Returning to a Less Popular Route -- 19.2 Theory and Experiments -- 19.2.1 Theoretical Framework -- 19.2.2 Experiments -- 19.2.2.1 Design -- 19.2.2.2 Experiment 1 -- 19.2.2.3 Experiment 2 -- 19.3 Experimental Results -- 19.3.1 Basics -- 19.3.2 Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning -- 19.4 Open Questions, Challenges, and Future Directions -- Appendix -- References -- 20 Emotions in Bargaining -- 20.1 The intrapersonal effects of emotions in bargaining -- 20.1.1 Relevant theories -- 20.1.2 Empirical work -- 20.2 The interpersonal effects of emotions in bargaining -- 20.2.1 Relevant theory -- 20.2.2 Empirical work -- 20.3 Emotion and deception in negotiation -- 20.3.1 Relevant theory -- 20.3.2 Empirical work -- 20.4 Conclusions and future directions -- References -- 21 Gender Differences in Negotiation and Policy for Equalizing Outcomes -- 21.1 Introduction.
21.2 "Fixing the women".
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Accordo provinciale di lavoro per le aziende artigiane del settore grafico ed affini : CNA, CGIL, CISL, UIL
