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Kant, Wittgenstein, and the performativity of thought / / Anna Aloisia Moser



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Autore: Moser Anna Aloisia Visualizza persona
Titolo: Kant, Wittgenstein, and the performativity of thought / / Anna Aloisia Moser Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Cham, Switzerland : , : Palgrave Macmillan, , [2021]
℗♭2021
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xvi, 158 pages)
Disciplina: 160
Soggetto topico: Thought and thinking - Philosophy
Performative (Philosophy)
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto: 1. Introduction: Kants Acts of the Mind and Wittgensteins Projection Method -- Part I Kant and the "I Think" as the Facticity of Thought -- 2. A Connection Between Thought and Thing A Priori -- 3. Judging as Connecting Thought and Thing -- 4. Synthesis and Bringing the Manifold of Intuition into an Image -- Part II Wittgensteins Picture Theory as a Method of Projection -- 5. The Form of the Proposition -- 6. Projection Method -- 7. Logic Degree Zero -- Part III Kants Schematizing and Wittgensteins Picturing or Projecting as Performativity -- 8. Kant, Synthesis, and Schema -- 9. Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Use -- 10. Performativity and the Act of Thinking -- 11. Conclusion.
Sommario/riassunto: This book explores the idea that there is a certain performativity of thought connecting Kants Critique of Pure Reason and Wittgensteins Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On this view, we make judgments and use propositions because we presuppose that our thinking is about something, and that our propositions have sense. Kants requirement of an a priori connection between intuitions and concepts is akin to Wittgensteins idea of the general propositional form as sharing a form with the world. Aloisia Moser argues that Kant speaks about acts of the mind, not about static categories. Furthermore, she elucidates the Tractatus logical form as a projection method that turns into a so-called zero method, whereby propositions are merely the scaffolding of the world. In so doing, Moser connects Kantian reflective judgment to Wittgensteinian rule-following. She thereby presents an account of performativity centering neither on theories nor methods, but on the application enacting them in the first place. Aloisia Moser is Assistant Professor in the Department of the History of Philosophy at the Catholic Private University in Linz, Austria.
Titolo autorizzato: Kant, Wittgenstein, and the performativity of thought  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 3-030-77550-X
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910495180703321
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