LEADER 03676nam 22005775 450 001 9910495180703321 005 20230810173153.0 010 $a3-030-77550-X 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-030-77550-6 035 $a(CKB)4100000012007911 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6708642 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL6708642 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-030-77550-6 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000012007911 100 $a20210818d2021 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aKant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought /$fby Aloisia Moser 205 $a1st ed. 2021. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2021. 215 $a1 online resource (xvi, 158 pages) 311 1 $a3-030-77549-6 311 08$aPrint version: Moser, Aloisia. Kant, Wittgenstein, and the performativity of thought. Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2021 9783030775490 (OCoLC)1259547869 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $a1. Introduction: Kant?s Acts of the Mind and Wittgenstein?s Projection Method -- Part I Kant and the ?I Think? as the Facticity of Thought -- 2. A Connection Between Thought and Thing A Priori -- 3. Judging as Connecting Thought and Thing -- 4. Synthesis and Bringing the Manifold of Intuition into an Image -- Part II Wittgenstein?s Picture Theory as a Method of Projection -- 5. The Form of the Proposition -- 6. Projection Method -- 7. Logic Degree Zero -- Part III Kant?s Schematizing and Wittgenstein?s Picturing or Projecting as Performativity -- 8. Kant, Synthesis, and Schema -- 9. Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Use -- 10. Performativity and the Act of Thinking -- 11. Conclusion. 330 $aThis book explores the idea that there is a certain performativity of thought connecting Kant?s Critique of Pure Reason and Wittgenstein?s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On this view, we make judgments and use propositions because we presuppose that our thinking is about something, and that our propositions have sense. Kant?s requirement of an a priori connection between intuitions and concepts is akin to Wittgenstein?s idea of the general propositional form as sharing a form with the world. Aloisia Moser argues that Kant speaks about acts of the mind, not about static categories. Furthermore, she elucidates the Tractatus? logical form as a projection method that turns into a so-called ?zero method?, whereby propositions are merely the scaffolding of the world. In so doing, Moser connects Kantian reflective judgment to Wittgensteinian rule-following. She thereby presents an account of performativity centering neither on theories nor methods, but on the application enacting them in the first place. Aloisia Moser is Assistant Professor in the Department of the History of Philosophy at the Catholic Private University in Linz, Austria. 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 606 $aPhilosophy$xHistory 606 $aHistory 606 $aPhilosophy of Mind 606 $aHistory of Philosophy 606 $aHistory 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 615 0$aPhilosophy$xHistory. 615 0$aHistory. 615 14$aPhilosophy of Mind. 615 24$aHistory of Philosophy. 615 24$aHistory. 676 $a160 676 $a121.68 700 $aMoser$b Anna Aloisia$01224318 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910495180703321 996 $aKant, Wittgenstein, and the performativity of thought$92841703 997 $aUNINA