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| Autore: |
Clarke Colin P
|
| Titolo: |
From stalemate to settlement : lessons for Afghanistan from historical insurgencies that have been resolved through negotiation / / Colin P. Clarke and Christopher Paul
|
| Pubblicazione: | Santa Monica, California : , : RAND, , 2014 |
| ©2014 | |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (93 p.) |
| Disciplina: | 341.5/2 |
| Soggetto topico: | Mediation, International |
| Peace-building | |
| Insurgency - Afghanistan | |
| Insurgency - History | |
| Altri autori: |
PaulChristopher <1971->
|
| Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
| Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Nota di contenuto: | Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies That Have Been Resolved Through Negotiations; Introduction; How to Reach a Negotiated Settlement in Counterinsurgency Warfare; The Notion of a Master Narrative; Methods: Getting to a Master Narrative; Previous RAND Research: Paths to Victory; Developing the Master Narrative; The Master Narrative; Step 1: Military Stalemate and War-Weariness |
| Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners or Non-AdversariesStep 3: Brokered Cease-Fires (Not Always Respected); Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements; Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers; Step 6: Moderation of Insurgent Leadership; Step 7: Third-Party Guarantors; Sequences in the Individual Cases; Extended Example: Northern Ireland, 1969-1999; Step 1: Military Stalemate and War-Weariness; Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners; Step 3: Brokered Cease-Fires (Not Always Respected); Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements | |
| Step 5: Power-Sharing OffersStep 6: Moderation of Insurgent Leadership; Step 7: Third-Party Guarantor; Twelve Additional Cases of Historical Insurgency Settled Through Negotiation; Yemen, 1962-1970; Philippines (MNLF), 1971-1996; Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990; Western Sahara, 1975-1991; Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976-1995; Indonesia (Aceh), 1976-2005; Kampuchea, 1978-1992; Bosnia, 1992-1995; Tajikistan, 1992-1997; Burundi, 1993-2003; Chechnya I, 1994-1996; Democratic Republic of the Congo (Anti-Kabila), 1998-2003; Following the Master Narrative Toward an End Game in Afghanistan | |
| Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating PartnersStep 3: Brokered Cease-Fires; Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements; Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers; Step 6: Moderation in Leadership; Step 7: Third-Party Guarantors; Conclusion; References | |
| Sommario/riassunto: | A comprehensive review of historical insurgencies that ended in settlement after a military stalemate shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a "master narrative" of seven steps executed in a common sequence. Such a narrative could help guide and assess the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw. |
| Titolo autorizzato: | From stalemate to settlement ![]() |
| ISBN: | 0-8330-8244-2 |
| 0-8330-8242-6 | |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910220151403321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |