04242nam 2200649 450 991022015140332120200520144314.00-8330-8244-20-8330-8242-6(CKB)2670000000529317(EBL)1640865(SSID)ssj0001132215(PQKBManifestationID)11663050(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001132215(PQKBWorkID)11147939(PQKB)10062899(Au-PeEL)EBL1640865(CaPaEBR)ebr10841343(OCoLC)869825458(MiAaPQ)EBC1640865(EXLCZ)99267000000052931720140313h20142014 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrFrom stalemate to settlement lessons for Afghanistan from historical insurgencies that have been resolved through negotiation /Colin P. Clarke and Christopher PaulSanta Monica, California :RAND,2014.©20141 online resource (93 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-8330-8237-X Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies That Have Been Resolved Through Negotiations; Introduction; How to Reach a Negotiated Settlement in Counterinsurgency Warfare; The Notion of a Master Narrative; Methods: Getting to a Master Narrative; Previous RAND Research: Paths to Victory; Developing the Master Narrative; The Master Narrative; Step 1: Military Stalemate and War-WearinessStep 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners or Non-AdversariesStep 3: Brokered Cease-Fires (Not Always Respected); Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements; Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers; Step 6: Moderation of Insurgent Leadership; Step 7: Third-Party Guarantors; Sequences in the Individual Cases; Extended Example: Northern Ireland, 1969-1999; Step 1: Military Stalemate and War-Weariness; Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners; Step 3: Brokered Cease-Fires (Not Always Respected); Step 4: Official Intermediate AgreementsStep 5: Power-Sharing OffersStep 6: Moderation of Insurgent Leadership; Step 7: Third-Party Guarantor; Twelve Additional Cases of Historical Insurgency Settled Through Negotiation; Yemen, 1962-1970; Philippines (MNLF), 1971-1996; Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990; Western Sahara, 1975-1991; Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976-1995; Indonesia (Aceh), 1976-2005; Kampuchea, 1978-1992; Bosnia, 1992-1995; Tajikistan, 1992-1997; Burundi, 1993-2003; Chechnya I, 1994-1996; Democratic Republic of the Congo (Anti-Kabila), 1998-2003; Following the Master Narrative Toward an End Game in AfghanistanStep 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating PartnersStep 3: Brokered Cease-Fires; Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements; Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers; Step 6: Moderation in Leadership; Step 7: Third-Party Guarantors; Conclusion; ReferencesA comprehensive review of historical insurgencies that ended in settlement after a military stalemate shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a "master narrative" of seven steps executed in a common sequence. Such a narrative could help guide and assess the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw.Mediation, InternationalPeace-buildingInsurgencyAfghanistanInsurgencyHistoryMediation, International.Peace-building.InsurgencyInsurgencyHistory.341.5/2Clarke Colin P308837Paul Christopher1971-904747MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910220151403321From stalemate to settlement2047538UNINA