Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation / / Kurt Annen, Luc Moers
| Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation / / Kurt Annen, Luc Moers |
| Autore | Annen Kurt |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (38 p.) |
| Altri autori (Persone) | MoersLuc |
| Collana | IMF Working Papers |
| Soggetto topico |
Economic assistance
Flow of funds Budgeting Exports and Imports Finance: General Social Services and Welfare Poverty and Homelessness Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General Foreign Aid International Fiscal Issues International Public Goods National Budget Budget Systems Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: General General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) Government Policy Provision and Effects of Welfare Program International economics Budgeting & financial management Poverty & precarity Finance Social welfare & social services Foreign aid Budget planning and preparation Poverty Competition Poverty reduction Public financial management (PFM) Financial markets International relief Budget |
| ISBN |
1-4755-2021-2
1-4755-3924-X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size
2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910786481803321 |
Annen Kurt
|
||
| Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012 | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation / / Kurt Annen, Luc Moers
| Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation / / Kurt Annen, Luc Moers |
| Autore | Annen Kurt |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (38 p.) |
| Disciplina | 337 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | MoersLuc |
| Collana | IMF Working Papers |
| Soggetto topico |
Economic assistance
Flow of funds Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General Budget planning and preparation Budget Systems Budget Budgeting & financial management Budgeting Competition Exports and Imports Finance Finance: General Financial markets Foreign Aid Foreign aid General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) Government Policy International economics International Fiscal Issues International Public Goods International relief National Budget Poverty & precarity Poverty and Homelessness Poverty reduction Poverty Provision and Effects of Welfare Program Public financial management (PFM) Social Services and Welfare Social welfare & social services Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: General |
| ISBN |
9781475520217
1475520212 9781475539240 147553924X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size
2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910957395003321 |
Annen Kurt
|
||
| Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012 | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||