LEADER 05859oam 22012974 450 001 9910786481803321 005 20230801225343.0 010 $a1-4755-2021-2 010 $a1-4755-3924-X 035 $a(CKB)2670000000278823 035 $a(EBL)1606936 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000949374 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11521999 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000949374 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10996015 035 $a(PQKB)10526840 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606936 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1606936 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10627044 035 $a(OCoLC)805985260 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2012204 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2012204 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000278823 100 $a20020129d2012 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aDonor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation /$fKurt Annen, Luc Moers 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (38 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4755-5957-7 311 $a1-4755-0554-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size 327 $a2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index 330 3 $aThis paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2012/204 606 $aEconomic assistance 606 $aFlow of funds 606 $aBudgeting$2imf 606 $aExports and Imports$2imf 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aSocial Services and Welfare$2imf 606 $aPoverty and Homelessness$2imf 606 $aAnalysis of Collective Decision-Making: General$2imf 606 $aForeign Aid$2imf 606 $aInternational Fiscal Issues$2imf 606 $aInternational Public Goods$2imf 606 $aNational Budget$2imf 606 $aBudget Systems$2imf 606 $aWelfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: General$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)$2imf 606 $aGovernment Policy$2imf 606 $aProvision and Effects of Welfare Program$2imf 606 $aInternational economics$2imf 606 $aBudgeting & financial management$2imf 606 $aPoverty & precarity$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aSocial welfare & social services$2imf 606 $aForeign aid$2imf 606 $aBudget planning and preparation$2imf 606 $aPoverty$2imf 606 $aCompetition$2imf 606 $aPoverty reduction$2imf 606 $aPublic financial management (PFM)$2imf 606 $aFinancial markets$2imf 606 $aInternational relief$2imf 606 $aBudget$2imf 607 $aChina, People's Republic of$2imf 615 0$aEconomic assistance. 615 0$aFlow of funds. 615 7$aBudgeting 615 7$aExports and Imports 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aSocial Services and Welfare 615 7$aPoverty and Homelessness 615 7$aAnalysis of Collective Decision-Making: General 615 7$aForeign Aid 615 7$aInternational Fiscal Issues 615 7$aInternational Public Goods 615 7$aNational Budget 615 7$aBudget Systems 615 7$aWelfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: General 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) 615 7$aGovernment Policy 615 7$aProvision and Effects of Welfare Program 615 7$aInternational economics 615 7$aBudgeting & financial management 615 7$aPoverty & precarity 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aSocial welfare & social services 615 7$aForeign aid 615 7$aBudget planning and preparation 615 7$aPoverty 615 7$aCompetition 615 7$aPoverty reduction 615 7$aPublic financial management (PFM) 615 7$aFinancial markets 615 7$aInternational relief 615 7$aBudget 700 $aAnnen$b Kurt$01578630 701 $aMoers$b Luc$01578631 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910786481803321 996 $aDonor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation$93858205 997 $aUNINA