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Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt / / Sven Jari Stehn, David Vines
| Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt / / Sven Jari Stehn, David Vines |
| Autore | Stehn Sven Jari |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (40 p.) |
| Disciplina | 336.39 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | VinesDavid |
| Collana |
IMF Working Papers
IMF working paper |
| Soggetto topico |
Expenditures, Public - Econometric models
Fiscal policy - Econometric models Banks and banking, Central - Econometric models Debts, Public - Econometric models Monetary policy - Econometric models Banks and Banking Inflation Public Finance Price Level Deflation National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General Fiscal Policy Debt Debt Management Sovereign Debt Banks Depository Institutions Micro Finance Institutions Mortgages Macroeconomics Public finance & taxation Banking Expenditure Fiscal policy Public debt Prices Expenditures, Public Debts, Public Banks and banking |
| ISBN |
1-4623-3158-0
9786612841156 1-282-84115-7 1-4519-8526-6 1-4518-7022-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Consumers; B. Price Setting; C. Aggregate Demand and Fiscal Policy; D. The System; E. Social Welfare; F. Policy Objectives; G. Calibration; III.Solving for Optimal Policy; A. Cooperative Policy; B. Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; Tables; 1. Optimal policy simulations for a transitory cost-push shock; IV.Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment; Figures; 1. Dynamic responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy. .; 2. Discretion |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910788234503321 |
Stehn Sven Jari
|
||
| Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt / / Sven Jari Stehn, David Vines
| Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt / / Sven Jari Stehn, David Vines |
| Autore | Stehn Sven Jari |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (40 p.) |
| Disciplina | 336.39 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | VinesDavid |
| Collana |
IMF Working Papers
IMF working paper |
| Soggetto topico |
Expenditures, Public - Econometric models
Fiscal policy - Econometric models Banks and banking, Central - Econometric models Debts, Public - Econometric models Monetary policy - Econometric models Banks and Banking Inflation Public Finance Price Level Deflation National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General Fiscal Policy Debt Debt Management Sovereign Debt Banks Depository Institutions Micro Finance Institutions Mortgages Macroeconomics Public finance & taxation Banking Expenditure Fiscal policy Public debt Prices Expenditures, Public Debts, Public Banks and banking |
| ISBN |
1-4623-3158-0
9786612841156 1-282-84115-7 1-4519-8526-6 1-4518-7022-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Consumers; B. Price Setting; C. Aggregate Demand and Fiscal Policy; D. The System; E. Social Welfare; F. Policy Objectives; G. Calibration; III.Solving for Optimal Policy; A. Cooperative Policy; B. Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; Tables; 1. Optimal policy simulations for a transitory cost-push shock; IV.Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment; Figures; 1. Dynamic responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy. .; 2. Discretion |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910818148203321 |
|
Stehn Sven Jari
|
||
| Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
