A collection of surveys on market experiments / / edited by Charles Noussair and Steven Tucker

• Pubblicazione: Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, Massachusetts : , : Wiley, , 2014
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (298 pages)
• Disciplina: 332.041501
• Soggetto topico: Business; Experimental economics; Game theory; Markets
• Altri autori: NoussairCharles TuckerSteven
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- A Collection of Surveys on Market Experiments -- CONTENTS -- 1 A COLLECTION OF SURVEYS ON MARKET EXPERIMENTS -- References -- 2 EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKETS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Experimental Gift-Exchange Labor Markets -- 2.1 Common Features Across Experiments -- 2.2 Fundamental Results -- 2.3 Gift-Exchange Labor Markets and Policy Instruments -- 2.4 Robustness and Extensions of Gift-Exchange Labor Markets -- 2.5 Summary -- 3. Experimental Labor Markets in Macroeconomics and Public Finance -- 4. Conclusions -- Notes -- References -- 3 PRICE DYNAMICS IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EXPERIMENTS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Price Dynamics in Laboratory Exchange Economies -- 2.1 Across-Period Dynamics -- 2.2 Within-Period Dynamics -- 3. Further Experimental GE Applications -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- 4 OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS IN THE CURRENT MILLENNIUM -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Oligopoly Competition from a Static Perspective -- 2.1 Simultaneous-Move Quantity and Price Competition -- 2.2 Sequential-Move Games, Timing and Commitment -- 2.3 Innovation and Competition -- 2.4 Price Dispersion -- 3. Dynamics, (non-)Convergence, and Learning Processes -- 3.1 Stability and Convergence of Cournot Markets -- 3.2 Cycles under Price Competition -- 3.3 Feedback, Information and Learning Processes -- 4. Collusion and Policy -- 4.1 Tacit Collusion -- 4.2 Cartels and Competition Policy -- 4.3 Regulation -- 5. Concluding Remarks -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- 5 MULTIUNIT AUCTIONS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Multiunit Auctions, Single-Unit Demand -- 2.1 Comparison of Auction Formats Motivated by Spectrum Sales -- 2.2 Other Single-Unit Demand Auctions -- 3. Multiunit Demand, No Synergies -- 3.1 Demand Reduction under Uniform-Price Auctions and Institutional Remedies. ; 3.2 Extensions to Asymmetric Bidders and Common Values -- 4. Synergies and Package Bidding -- 4.1 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Auctions -- 4.2 Exposure and Threshold Problems -- 4.3 Comparison of Alternative Auction Mechanisms -- 5. Role of Specific Institutional Features -- 5.1 Bid Withdrawal and Eligibility Rules -- 5.2 Ending Rules -- 5.3 Jump Bidding -- 6. Collusion -- 6.1 Collusion with Explicit Communication -- 6.2 Tacit Collusion -- 7. Sequential Bidding -- 7.1 Auction Formats and Sequencing of Sales -- 7.2 Price Trends in Sequential Auctions -- 8. Conclusions and Open Questions -- 8.1 Comparison of Auction Formats and Alternative Mechanisms -- 8.2 Asymmetric Bidders, Entry, and Competition among Auctions -- 8.3 Behavioral Models of Bidding -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- 6 OVERBIDDING AND HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR IN CONTEST EXPERIMENTS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Simple Contest Model -- 3. Experimental Findings on Contests -- 4. Overbidding in Contests -- 4.1 Bounded Rationality -- 4.2 Utility of Winning -- 4.3 Other-Regarding Preferences -- 4.4 Probability Distortion -- 4.5 The Shape of the Payoff Function -- 4.6 How to Reduce Overbidding -- 5. Heterogeneous Behavior in Contests -- 5.1 Heterogeneous Preferences -- 5.2 Demographic Differences -- 5.3 Learning and Hot Hand -- 5.4 How to Reduce Heterogeneity -- 6. Discussion and Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- 7 ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: WHAT DO WE LEARN FROM THE LAB? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Emission Trading Experiments -- 2.1 Trading Institutions -- 2.2 Uncertainty and Enforcement -- 2.3 Market Power -- 3. Other Environmental Policy Experiments -- 3.1 Water Markets -- 3.2 Conservation Auctions and Agricultural Policy -- 3.3 Other Market Experiments that Inform Environmental Policy -- 4. Conclusion and the Way Forward -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References. ; 8 EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS WITH FRICTIONS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Modeling Decentralized Frictional Markets -- 3. A Review of Recent Experimental Work on Markets with Frictions -- 3.1 Peer Punishment -- 3.2 Monetary Exchange -- 3.3 Communication -- 4. Communication in Markets with Frictions: A New Experimental Approach -- 4.1 Experimental Design -- 4.2 Four Results -- 5. Discussion and Conclusions -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- Supporting Information -- 9 EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH ON ASSET PRICING -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Early Work -- 3. Market Microstructure -- 4. Parimutuel Betting Markets -- 5. Participant Characteristics -- 5.1 Behavioral Traits -- 5.2 Traders' Emotional States -- 5.3 Trader Strategies -- 6. Public Information Release -- 7. Studies of the Capital Asset Pricing Model -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 10 A REVIEW OF BUBBLES AND CRASHES IN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS -- 1. Description of the Baseline Market -- 1.1 Market Design -- 1.2 Typical Price and Volume Patterns -- 2. Stylized Results -- 2.1 Trader Characteristics -- 2.2 Expectations -- 2.3 Asset-to-Cash Ratio -- 2.4 Short-Selling -- 2.5 Dividends -- 2.6 Fundamental Value -- 2.7 Endowments -- 2.8 Taxes and Transaction Costs -- 2.9 Limit Price Change Rule and Asset Holdings Cap -- 2.10 Derivative Instruments -- 2.11 Institution of Exchange -- 2.12 Compensation and Incentives -- 2.13 Social Comparison -- 2.14 Communication -- 2.15 Relative Prices in Multi-Asset Markets -- 3 Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- 11 PREDICTION MARKETS IN THE LABORATORY -- 1. The Success of Markets Aggregating Information -- 2. Comparisons of Predication Markets with Other Mechanisms for Information Aggregation -- 3. How Do Insiders Impact Markets? -- 4. Manipulation -- 5. Future Work -- Notes -- References -- INDEX.
• Titolo autorizzato: A collection of surveys on market experiments
• ISBN: 1-118-79070-7; 1-118-79068-5; 1-118-79069-3
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910822002803321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II