LEADER 01836nam 2200385Ia 450 001 996386878903316 005 20200824132738.0 035 $a(CKB)4940000000078174 035 $a(EEBO)2248579679 035 $a(OCoLC)ocm12630204e 035 $a(OCoLC)12630204 035 $a(EXLCZ)994940000000078174 100 $a19851003d1642 uy | 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurbn||||a|bb| 200 02$aA briefe relation discovering plainely the true causes why the great levell of fenns in the severall counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridge, Huntington, Northampton, and Lincolne shires, being three hundred and seven thousand acres of low-lands, have been drowned and made unfruitfull for many yeares past$b[electronic resource] $eand as briefly how they may be drained, and preserved from inundation in the times to come : humbly presented to the honourable House of Commons assembled in Parliament /$fby Andrewes Burrell, gent 210 $aLondon $cPrinted for Francis Constable$d1642 215 $a[6], 22 p 300 $aReproduction of original in Thomason Collection, British Library. 330 $aeebo-0158 606 $aDrainage$zEngland 606 $aReclamation of land$zEngland 607 $aFens, The (England) 615 0$aDrainage 615 0$aReclamation of land 700 $aBurrell$b Andrewes$01006972 801 0$bEAA 801 1$bEAA 801 2$bm/c 801 2$bUMI 801 2$bWaOLN 906 $aBOOK 912 $a996386878903316 996 $aA briefe relation discovering plainely the true causes why the great levell of fenns in the severall counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridge, Huntington, Northampton, and Lincolne shires, being three hundred and seven thousand acres of low-lands, have been drowned and made unfruitfull for many yeares past$92332882 997 $aUNISA LEADER 08285nam 22007811 450 001 9910822002803321 005 20240401225803.0 010 $a9781118790700 010 $a1118790707 010 $a9781118790687 010 $a1118790685 010 $a9781118790694 010 $a1118790693 035 $a(CKB)2550000001157309 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001040272 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11641751 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001040272 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11001527 035 $a(PQKB)10761635 035 $a(DLC) 2013039177 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1527857 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10799612 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL540352 035 $a(PPN)188693610 035 $a(OCoLC)858975637 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1527857 035 $a(FR-PaCSA)88826906 035 $a(FRCYB88826906)88826906 035 $a(Perlego)1002694 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001157309 100 $a20131107d2014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 02$aA collection of surveys on market experiments /$fedited by Charles Noussair and Steven Tucker 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aChichester, West Sussex ;$aMalden, Massachusetts :$cWiley,$d2014. 215 $a1 online resource (298 pages) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a9781118790717 311 08$a1118790715 311 08$a9781306091015 311 08$a1306091012 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntro -- A Collection of Surveys on Market Experiments -- CONTENTS -- 1 A COLLECTION OF SURVEYS ON MARKET EXPERIMENTS -- References -- 2 EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKETS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Experimental Gift-Exchange Labor Markets -- 2.1 Common Features Across Experiments -- 2.2 Fundamental Results -- 2.3 Gift-Exchange Labor Markets and Policy Instruments -- 2.4 Robustness and Extensions of Gift-Exchange Labor Markets -- 2.5 Summary -- 3. Experimental Labor Markets in Macroeconomics and Public Finance -- 4. Conclusions -- Notes -- References -- 3 PRICE DYNAMICS IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EXPERIMENTS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Price Dynamics in Laboratory Exchange Economies -- 2.1 Across-Period Dynamics -- 2.2 Within-Period Dynamics -- 3. Further Experimental GE Applications -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- 4 OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS IN THE CURRENT MILLENNIUM -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Oligopoly Competition from a Static Perspective -- 2.1 Simultaneous-Move Quantity and Price Competition -- 2.2 Sequential-Move Games, Timing and Commitment -- 2.3 Innovation and Competition -- 2.4 Price Dispersion -- 3. Dynamics, (non-)Convergence, and Learning Processes -- 3.1 Stability and Convergence of Cournot Markets -- 3.2 Cycles under Price Competition -- 3.3 Feedback, Information and Learning Processes -- 4. Collusion and Policy -- 4.1 Tacit Collusion -- 4.2 Cartels and Competition Policy -- 4.3 Regulation -- 5. Concluding Remarks -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- 5 MULTIUNIT AUCTIONS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Multiunit Auctions, Single-Unit Demand -- 2.1 Comparison of Auction Formats Motivated by Spectrum Sales -- 2.2 Other Single-Unit Demand Auctions -- 3. Multiunit Demand, No Synergies -- 3.1 Demand Reduction under Uniform-Price Auctions and Institutional Remedies. 327 $a3.2 Extensions to Asymmetric Bidders and Common Values -- 4. Synergies and Package Bidding -- 4.1 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Auctions -- 4.2 Exposure and Threshold Problems -- 4.3 Comparison of Alternative Auction Mechanisms -- 5. Role of Specific Institutional Features -- 5.1 Bid Withdrawal and Eligibility Rules -- 5.2 Ending Rules -- 5.3 Jump Bidding -- 6. Collusion -- 6.1 Collusion with Explicit Communication -- 6.2 Tacit Collusion -- 7. Sequential Bidding -- 7.1 Auction Formats and Sequencing of Sales -- 7.2 Price Trends in Sequential Auctions -- 8. Conclusions and Open Questions -- 8.1 Comparison of Auction Formats and Alternative Mechanisms -- 8.2 Asymmetric Bidders, Entry, and Competition among Auctions -- 8.3 Behavioral Models of Bidding -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- 6 OVERBIDDING AND HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR IN CONTEST EXPERIMENTS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Simple Contest Model -- 3. Experimental Findings on Contests -- 4. Overbidding in Contests -- 4.1 Bounded Rationality -- 4.2 Utility of Winning -- 4.3 Other-Regarding Preferences -- 4.4 Probability Distortion -- 4.5 The Shape of the Payoff Function -- 4.6 How to Reduce Overbidding -- 5. Heterogeneous Behavior in Contests -- 5.1 Heterogeneous Preferences -- 5.2 Demographic Differences -- 5.3 Learning and Hot Hand -- 5.4 How to Reduce Heterogeneity -- 6. Discussion and Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- 7 ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: WHAT DO WE LEARN FROM THE LAB? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Emission Trading Experiments -- 2.1 Trading Institutions -- 2.2 Uncertainty and Enforcement -- 2.3 Market Power -- 3. Other Environmental Policy Experiments -- 3.1 Water Markets -- 3.2 Conservation Auctions and Agricultural Policy -- 3.3 Other Market Experiments that Inform Environmental Policy -- 4. Conclusion and the Way Forward -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References. 327 $a8 EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS WITH FRICTIONS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Modeling Decentralized Frictional Markets -- 3. A Review of Recent Experimental Work on Markets with Frictions -- 3.1 Peer Punishment -- 3.2 Monetary Exchange -- 3.3 Communication -- 4. Communication in Markets with Frictions: A New Experimental Approach -- 4.1 Experimental Design -- 4.2 Four Results -- 5. Discussion and Conclusions -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- Supporting Information -- 9 EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH ON ASSET PRICING -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Early Work -- 3. Market Microstructure -- 4. Parimutuel Betting Markets -- 5. Participant Characteristics -- 5.1 Behavioral Traits -- 5.2 Traders' Emotional States -- 5.3 Trader Strategies -- 6. Public Information Release -- 7. Studies of the Capital Asset Pricing Model -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 10 A REVIEW OF BUBBLES AND CRASHES IN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS -- 1. Description of the Baseline Market -- 1.1 Market Design -- 1.2 Typical Price and Volume Patterns -- 2. Stylized Results -- 2.1 Trader Characteristics -- 2.2 Expectations -- 2.3 Asset-to-Cash Ratio -- 2.4 Short-Selling -- 2.5 Dividends -- 2.6 Fundamental Value -- 2.7 Endowments -- 2.8 Taxes and Transaction Costs -- 2.9 Limit Price Change Rule and Asset Holdings Cap -- 2.10 Derivative Instruments -- 2.11 Institution of Exchange -- 2.12 Compensation and Incentives -- 2.13 Social Comparison -- 2.14 Communication -- 2.15 Relative Prices in Multi-Asset Markets -- 3 Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- 11 PREDICTION MARKETS IN THE LABORATORY -- 1. The Success of Markets Aggregating Information -- 2. Comparisons of Predication Markets with Other Mechanisms for Information Aggregation -- 3. How Do Insiders Impact Markets? -- 4. Manipulation -- 5. Future Work -- Notes -- References -- INDEX. 330 8 $aComprised of 10 surveys by leading scholars, this collection showcases the largest and fastest growing strands of research on market behaviour in experimental economics. * Covers topics such as asset markets, contests, environmental policy, frictions, general equilibrium, labour markets, multi-unit auctions, oligopoly markets, and prediction markets * Focuses on the literature that has helped economists best understand how markets operate * Assesses the impact of developments in theory, policy, and research methods 606 $aBusiness 606 $aExperimental economics 606 $aGame theory 606 $aMarkets 615 0$aBusiness. 615 0$aExperimental economics. 615 0$aGame theory. 615 0$aMarkets. 676 $a332.041501 701 $aNoussair$b Charles$0739376 701 $aTucker$b Steven$01715459 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910822002803321 996 $aA collection of surveys on market experiments$94110120 997 $aUNINA