A Model of Sovereign Debt in Democracies / / Ali Alichi

• Autore: Alichi Ali
• Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (36 pages) : illustrations, tables
• Disciplina: 336.340151954
• Soggetto topico: Debts, Public - Econometric models; Capital market - Econometric models; Exports and Imports; Finance: General; Insurance; Public Finance; Industries: Financial Services; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies; Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt; Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors; General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data); International Lending and Debt Problems; Insurance & actuarial studies; Finance; Public finance & taxation; International economics; Public debt; Insurance companies; International capital markets; Debt default; Debts, Public; Capital market; Debts, External
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Relevant Literature and Our Contribution -- III. The Model -- Theoretical Model -- A. Insurance Contracts -- B. Definition of Default -- C. Sequence of Events -- D. The Foreign Insurer -- E. The Country -- The Voting Process -- The Turn-Out Rate -- The Old Voters -- The Young Voters -- F. Contract Concepts -- Default-Free Contract -- Default-Free Contract for Quadratic Preferences -- Default-Repayment Contract -- Comparison of Contract Conditions -- Default-Renegotiation Contract -- G. Income Heterogeneity and Changes in Population Mixture -- IV. Empirical Results -- A. List of Countries -- B. Proofs.
• Sommario/riassunto: This paper develops and empirically tests a political economy model of sovereign debt. The main incentive for repaying sovereign debt is to maintain access to international capital markets. However, in a democracy, one generation may choose default regardless of its consequences for future generations. An old generation with little concern for its country's access to capital markets can force a default on debt if it has the majority of voters. On the other hand, if the younger generation is more numerous, it can force repayment of previously defaulted debt. Other voter heterogeneities, such as in income, can generate similar results.
• Titolo autorizzato: A Model of Sovereign Debt in Democracies
• ISBN: 1-4623-4167-5; 9786612841033; 1-282-84103-3; 1-4519-9737-X; 1-4518-7010-8
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910807487403321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2008/152