LEADER 05209oam 22012254 450 001 9910807487403321 005 20240402044604.0 010 $a1-4623-4167-5 010 $a9786612841033 010 $a1-282-84103-3 010 $a1-4519-9737-X 010 $a1-4518-7010-8 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055043 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943322 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11502965 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943322 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10978112 035 $a(PQKB)10859402 035 $a(OCoLC)762485783 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1605821 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2008152 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055043 100 $a20020129d2008 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 12$aA Model of Sovereign Debt in Democracies /$fAli Alichi 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 215 $a1 online resource (36 pages) $cillustrations, tables 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/152 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-4519-1463-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aIntro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Relevant Literature and Our Contribution -- III. The Model -- Theoretical Model -- A. Insurance Contracts -- B. Definition of Default -- C. Sequence of Events -- D. The Foreign Insurer -- E. The Country -- The Voting Process -- The Turn-Out Rate -- The Old Voters -- The Young Voters -- F. Contract Concepts -- Default-Free Contract -- Default-Free Contract for Quadratic Preferences -- Default-Repayment Contract -- Comparison of Contract Conditions -- Default-Renegotiation Contract -- G. Income Heterogeneity and Changes in Population Mixture -- IV. Empirical Results -- A. List of Countries -- B. Proofs. 330 3 $aThis paper develops and empirically tests a political economy model of sovereign debt. The main incentive for repaying sovereign debt is to maintain access to international capital markets. However, in a democracy, one generation may choose default regardless of its consequences for future generations. An old generation with little concern for its country's access to capital markets can force a default on debt if it has the majority of voters. On the other hand, if the younger generation is more numerous, it can force repayment of previously defaulted debt. Other voter heterogeneities, such as in income, can generate similar results. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2008/152 606 $aDebts, Public$xEconometric models 606 $aCapital market$xEconometric models 606 $aExports and Imports$2imf 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aInsurance$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aIndustries: Financial Services$2imf 606 $aInsurance Companies$2imf 606 $aActuarial Studies$2imf 606 $aDebt$2imf 606 $aDebt Management$2imf 606 $aSovereign Debt$2imf 606 $aPension Funds$2imf 606 $aNon-bank Financial Institutions$2imf 606 $aFinancial Instruments$2imf 606 $aInstitutional Investors$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)$2imf 606 $aInternational Lending and Debt Problems$2imf 606 $aInsurance & actuarial studies$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aInternational economics$2imf 606 $aPublic debt$2imf 606 $aInsurance companies$2imf 606 $aInternational capital markets$2imf 606 $aDebt default$2imf 606 $aDebts, Public$2imf 606 $aCapital market$2imf 606 $aDebts, External$2imf 615 0$aDebts, Public$xEconometric models. 615 0$aCapital market$xEconometric models. 615 7$aExports and Imports 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aInsurance 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aIndustries: Financial Services 615 7$aInsurance Companies 615 7$aActuarial Studies 615 7$aDebt 615 7$aDebt Management 615 7$aSovereign Debt 615 7$aPension Funds 615 7$aNon-bank Financial Institutions 615 7$aFinancial Instruments 615 7$aInstitutional Investors 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) 615 7$aInternational Lending and Debt Problems 615 7$aInsurance & actuarial studies 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aInternational economics 615 7$aPublic debt 615 7$aInsurance companies 615 7$aInternational capital markets 615 7$aDebt default 615 7$aDebts, Public 615 7$aCapital market 615 7$aDebts, External 676 $a336.340151954 700 $aAlichi$b Ali$01599382 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910807487403321 996 $aA Model of Sovereign Debt in Democracies$93986917 997 $aUNINA