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Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs / / Eza Ghassan Al-Zein



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Autore: Al-Zein Eza Ghassan Visualizza persona
Titolo: Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs / / Eza Ghassan Al-Zein Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (28 p.)
Disciplina: 332.15
Soggetto topico: Bank reserves - Econometric models
Banks and banking, Central - Econometric models
Bank failures - Econometric models
Debts, Public - Econometric models
Banks and Banking
Exports and Imports
Investments: Bonds
Money and Monetary Policy
Monetary Policy
Banks
Depository Institutions
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
International Investment
Long-term Capital Movements
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
Monetary economics
Banking
International economics
Investment & securities
Finance
Reserve requirements
Capital controls
Bonds
Real interest rates
Monetary policy
Banks and banking
Capital movements
Interest rates
Soggetto geografico: Chile
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. Motivation and Literature; III. The Model; A. The Domestic Economy; B. Date-Specific and Maturity-Specific Reserve Requirements; C. The Lenders' Problem; D. Defining the Equilibrium; Figures; 1. Structure of the Model; IV. The Emergence of Bank Runs; A. The Emergence of Bank Runs in the Setup Without Reserve Requirements; Defining the Illiquidity Condition; 2. Decision Tree at t=1 Summarizes How a Bank Run Would Occur.; B. Can Reserve Requirements Prevent the Occurrence of a Bank Run?; Illiquidity Conditions with Reserve Requirements
Reserve Requirements and Market FailureC. International Lending After the Bank Runs: Are International Lenders "Throwing Good Money After Bad Money"?; International Re-Optimization Problem; V. Discussion; Sunspot and Bank Run Probability; Incentive to Form a Bank; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References
Sommario/riassunto: The paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after a bank run.
Titolo autorizzato: Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-4268-X
1-4527-9751-X
9786612840623
1-282-84062-2
1-4518-6968-1
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910788240303321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2008/108