1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910788240303321

Autore

Al-Zein Eza Ghassan

Titolo

Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs / / Eza Ghassan Al-Zein

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008

ISBN

1-4623-4268-X

1-4527-9751-X

9786612840623

1-282-84062-2

1-4518-6968-1

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (28 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/108

Disciplina

332.15

Soggetti

Bank reserves - Econometric models

Banks and banking, Central - Econometric models

Bank failures - Econometric models

Debts, Public - Econometric models

Banks and Banking

Exports and Imports

Investments: Bonds

Money and Monetary Policy

Monetary Policy

Banks

Depository Institutions

Micro Finance Institutions

Mortgages

International Investment

Long-term Capital Movements

General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)

Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects

Monetary economics

Banking

International economics

Investment & securities

Finance

Reserve requirements

Capital controls

Bonds



Real interest rates

Monetary policy

Banks and banking

Capital movements

Interest rates

Chile

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; I. Introduction; II. Motivation and Literature; III. The Model; A. The Domestic Economy; B. Date-Specific and Maturity-Specific Reserve Requirements; C. The Lenders' Problem; D. Defining the Equilibrium; Figures; 1. Structure of the Model; IV. The Emergence of Bank Runs; A. The Emergence of Bank Runs in the Setup Without Reserve Requirements; Defining the Illiquidity Condition; 2. Decision Tree at t=1 Summarizes How a Bank Run Would Occur.; B. Can Reserve Requirements Prevent the Occurrence of a Bank Run?; Illiquidity Conditions with Reserve Requirements

Reserve Requirements and Market FailureC. International Lending After the Bank Runs: Are International Lenders "Throwing Good Money After Bad Money"?; International Re-Optimization Problem; V. Discussion; Sunspot and Bank Run Probability; Incentive to Form a Bank; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References

Sommario/riassunto

The paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after a bank run.