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Autore: |
Pardalos Panos
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Titolo: |
Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy : 4th International Conference MARBLE 2023, London, United Kingdom
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Pubblicazione: | Cham : , : Springer, , 2024 |
©2023 | |
Edizione: | 1st ed. |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (193 pages) |
Altri autori: |
KotsireasIlias
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Nota di contenuto: | Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Deep Reinforcement Learning-Based Rebalancing Policies for Profit Maximization of Relay Nodes in Payment Channel Networks -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Payment Channel Networks and the Need for Rebalancing -- 2.2 The Submarine Swap Rebalancing Mechanism -- 3 Problem Formulation -- 3.1 System Evolution -- 3.2 Writing the Problem as a Markov Decision Process -- 4 Heuristic and Reinforcement Learning-Based Policies -- 4.1 Heuristic Policies -- 4.2 Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm Design -- 5 Evaluation -- 6 Related Work -- 7 Conclusion -- A Causes of Channel Depletion -- B The Submarine Swap Protocol -- C An Equivalent Objective -- D Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm Design Details -- D.1 Helping a Swap-In Succeed -- D.2 Design Choices -- D.3 Practical Applicability -- E Hyperparameters and Rewards -- F Additional Experimental Results -- F.1 The RebEL Policy Under Even Demand -- F.2 The Role of the Initial Conditions -- References -- Game-Theoretic Randomness for Proof-of-Stake -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Games and Equilibria -- 2.2 Publicly-Verifiable Secret Sharing -- 2.3 Verifiable Delay Functions -- 3 Random Integer Generation Game (RIG) -- 3.1 Overview of RIG -- 3.2 Analysis of Alliance-Resistant Nash Equilibria -- 3.3 Dense RIG Bimatrix Game -- 4 Designing a Random Beacon Based on RIG -- 4.1 Commitment Scheme and VDF Approach -- 4.2 PVSS Approach -- 4.3 Further Details of the Approach -- 4.4 Assumptions and Limits to Applicability -- 5 RIG in Proof of Stake Protocols -- 5.1 RIG in Ouroboros Praos -- 5.2 RIG in Algorand -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Model -- 2.1 Extension to n+1 Validators -- 2.2 Silent Validators -- 3 Protocol Level Incentives -- 4 Conclusions and Future Work -- References. |
Characterizing Common Quarterly Behaviors in DeFi Lending Protocols -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Methods -- 2.1 Data Sources -- 2.2 Transaction-Level Data -- 2.3 Address-Level Summaries -- 2.4 Computation of Clusters -- 3 Results -- 3.1 Interpretations of Clusters -- 3.2 Insights Derived From Clusters -- 4 Related Work -- 5 Discussion and Future Work -- References -- Blockchain Transaction Censorship: (In)secure and (In)efficient? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Blockchain and Smart Contracts -- 2.2 Centralized Transaction Propagation Services -- 2.3 ZKP Mixers -- 2.4 Blockchain Regulation and Censorship -- 3 System Model -- 3.1 System Components -- 3.2 Blockchain Censoring -- 3.3 Threat Model -- 4 Censorship During Transaction Validation -- 4.1 Miners' Censorship on Tainted Transactions -- 4.2 DoS Censoring Miners Through Crafting Tainted Transactions -- 4.3 Attack Cost -- 5 Censorship During Transaction Propagation -- 5.1 FaaS Workflow -- 5.2 FaaS Censorship Mechanism -- 5.3 DoS Censoring FaaS Searchers and Builders -- 6 Censorship During Transaction Generation -- 6.1 Non-transparent Frontend-Level Censorship -- 6.2 Investigating DeFi Platforms' Censorship -- 6.3 Tainting Innocent Addresses -- 6.4 Bypassing Frontend-Level Censorship -- 7 Related Work -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- An Automated Market Maker Minimizing Loss-Versus-Rebalancing -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Contribution -- 1.2 Organization of the Paper -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Preliminaries -- 3.1 Constant Function Market Makers -- 3.2 Loss-Versus-Rebalancing -- 3.3 Auctions -- 4 Diamond -- 4.1 Model Assumptions -- 4.2 Core Protocol -- 4.3 Per-block Conversion Versus Future Contracts -- 4.4 Periodic Conversion Auction -- 5 Diamond Properties -- 6 Implementation -- 6.1 Core Protocol -- 6.2 Conversion Protocols -- 7 Experimental Analysis -- 8 Conclusion -- A Proofs -- References. | |
Profit Lag and Alternate Network Mining -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Nakamoto Consensus -- 1.2 Mining Process -- 1.3 Selfish Mining -- 1.4 Smart Mining -- 1.5 Intermittent Selfish Mining -- 1.6 Alternate Network Mining -- 1.7 Organization of This Article -- 2 Modelization -- 2.1 Mining and Difficulty Adjustment Formula -- 2.2 Notations -- 2.3 Profitability of a Mining Strategy -- 2.4 Attack Cycles -- 2.5 Performant Strategy and Profit Lag -- 3 Selfish Mining Revisited -- 3.1 Previous State-Machine Approach Revisited -- 3.2 Profit Lag -- 4 Intermittent Selfish Mining Strategy -- 4.1 Profit Lag -- 5 Alternate Network Mining Strategy -- 5.1 Profit Lag -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Oracle Counterpoint: Relationships Between On-Chain and Off-Chain Market Data -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Methods -- 2.1 Fundamental Economic Features from On-Chain Markets -- 2.2 Data-Driven Feature Analysis -- 2.3 Modeling Off-Chain Prices -- 3 Results -- 3.1 Feature Analysis -- 3.2 Recovering Off-Chain Prices from On-Chain Data -- 3.3 Performance of Price Recovery -- 4 Discussion -- A More Details on Dataset Features -- A.1.1 Economic Features -- B Further Information on Ethereum Analysis -- B.1.1 Performance of Price Recovery -- C Analysis of Celo PoS Data -- References -- Exploring Decentralized Governance: A Framework Applied to Compound Finance -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Motivation -- 1.2 Contribution Summary -- 2 Compound -- 2.1 Governance -- 3 Relevant Work -- 3.1 Literature Discussion -- 4 Methodology and Data -- 4.1 Data -- 4.2 Methodology -- 4.3 Top 100 Leaderboard -- 4.4 Proposals -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusions -- Appendix A Proof for Gini and Nakamoto Coefficients When n = 2 and u1 = u2 -- References -- A Mathematical Approach on the Use of Integer Partitions for Smurfing in Cryptocurrencies -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work. | |
3 Using Integer Partitions to Create Patterns for Smurfing -- 3.1 Problem Formulation -- 3.2 Possible Implications of the Conceptualization of Smurfing via Integer Partitions -- 3.3 Examples for Integer Partitions and Smurfing -- 4 Conclusion and Future Work -- References -- Bigger Than We Thought: The Upbit Hack Gang -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Rough ML Network Construction -- 2.1 Crawling Tool and Event -- 2.2 Account and Transaction Data Crawling -- 2.3 Network Construction -- 3 ML Network Refinement -- 3.1 Design an ML Suspiciousness Indicator -- 3.2 Calculate ML Risks of Accounts -- 4 Results and Analysis -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Staking Pools on Blockchains. | |
Titolo autorizzato: | Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy ![]() |
ISBN: | 3-031-48731-1 |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910770270303321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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