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A Framework for Independent Monetary Policy in China / / Marvin Goodfriend, Eswar Prasad



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Autore: Goodfriend Marvin Visualizza persona
Titolo: A Framework for Independent Monetary Policy in China / / Marvin Goodfriend, Eswar Prasad Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (52 p.)
Soggetto topico: Monetary policy - China
Banks and Banking
Inflation
Money and Monetary Policy
Banks
Depository Institutions
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
Price Level
Deflation
Monetary Policy
Banking
Macroeconomics
Monetary economics
Commercial banks
Inflation targeting
Monetary policy frameworks
Banks and banking
Prices
Monetary policy
Soggetto geografico: China Economic conditions
China, People's Republic of
Altri autori: PrasadEswar  
Note generali: "May 2006."
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW""; ""II. LOW INFLATION OBJECTIVE AS NOMINAL ANCHOR""; ""III. PRINCIPLES OF MONETARY POLICY GEARED TOWARD TARGETING INFLATION""; ""IV. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT MONETARY POLICY""; ""V. MONETARY AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA""; ""VI. INDEPENDENT MONETARY POLICY FOR CHINA""; ""VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""REFERENCES""
Sommario/riassunto: As China's economy becomes more market based and continues its rapid integration into the global economy, having an independent and effective monetary policy regime oriented to domestic objectives will become increasingly important. Employing modern principles of monetary policy in light of the current state of China's financial institutions, we motivate and present a package of proposals to guide the operation of a new monetary policy regime. Specifically, we recommend an explicit low long-run inflation objective, operational independence for the People's Bank of China (PBC) with formal strategic guidance from the government, and a minimal set of financial sector reforms (to make the Chinese banking system robust against interest rate fluctuations). We argue that anchoring monetary policy with an explicit inflation objective would be the most reliable way for the PBC to tie down inflation expectations, and thereby enable monetary policy to make the best contribution to macroeconomic and financial stability, as well as economic growth. The management and monitoring of money (and credit) growth by the PBC would continue to play a useful role in the stabilization of inflation, but a money target would not constitute a good stand-alone nominal anchor.
Titolo autorizzato: A Framework for Independent Monetary Policy in China  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-5989-2
1-4527-1382-0
1-283-51390-0
9786613826350
1-4519-0905-5
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910810746803321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2006/111