LEADER 03406nam 2200601Ia 450 001 9910810746803321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4623-5989-2 010 $a1-4527-1382-0 010 $a1-283-51390-0 010 $a9786613826350 010 $a1-4519-0905-5 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443626 035 $a(EBL)3014426 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940018 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11600613 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940018 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10956247 035 $a(PQKB)11644071 035 $a(OCoLC)694141073 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2006111 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014426 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443626 100 $a20060929d2006 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 12$aA framework for independent monetary policy in China /$fMarvin Goodfriend and Eswar Prasad 205 $a1st ed. 210 $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund, African Dept.$dc2006 215 $a1 online resource (52 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/06/111 300 $a"May 2006." 311 $a1-4518-6371-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW""; ""II. LOW INFLATION OBJECTIVE AS NOMINAL ANCHOR""; ""III. PRINCIPLES OF MONETARY POLICY GEARED TOWARD TARGETING INFLATION""; ""IV. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT MONETARY POLICY""; ""V. MONETARY AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA""; ""VI. INDEPENDENT MONETARY POLICY FOR CHINA""; ""VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aAs China's economy becomes more market based and continues its rapid integration into the global economy, having an independent and effective monetary policy regime oriented to domestic objectives will become increasingly important. Employing modern principles of monetary policy in light of the current state of China's financial institutions, we motivate and present a package of proposals to guide the operation of a new monetary policy regime. Specifically, we recommend an explicit low long-run inflation objective, operational independence for the People's Bank of China (PBC) with formal strategic guidance from the government, and a minimal set of financial sector reforms (to make the Chinese banking system robust against interest rate fluctuations). We argue that anchoring monetary policy with an explicit inflation objective would be the most reliable way for the PBC to tie down inflation expectations, and thereby enable monetary policy to make the best contribution to macroeconomic and financial stability, as well as economic growth. The management and monitoring of money (and credit) growth by the PBC would continue to play a useful role in the stabilization of inflation, but a money target would not constitute a good stand-alone nominal anchor. 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/06/111. 606 $aMonetary policy$zChina 607 $aChina$xEconomic conditions 615 0$aMonetary policy 700 $aGoodfriend$b Marvin$01621913 701 $aPrasad$b Eswar$0124415 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910810746803321 996 $aA Framework for Independent Monetary Policy in China$93955452 997 $aUNINA