Optimal Tax Administration / / Michael Keen, Joel Slemrod

• Autore: Keen Michael
• Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2017
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (28 pages) : illustrations (some color), graphs, tables
• Disciplina: 336.2
• Soggetto topico: Tax administration and procedure; Taxpayer compliance; Macroeconomics; Public Finance; Taxation; Efficiency; Optimal Taxation; Tax Evasion and Avoidance; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General; Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions; Public finance & taxation; Personal income; Tax gap; Tax administration core functions; Compliance costs; Revenue administration; National accounts; Revenue performance assessment; Income; Revenue
• Soggetto geografico: United States
• Altri autori: SlemrodJoel
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Sommario/riassunto: This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.
• Titolo autorizzato: Optimal Tax Administration
• ISBN: 1-4755-7030-9; 1-4755-7037-6
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910162926103321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2017/008