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[null,"1.","Record Nr.",null,"UNINA9910162926103321"]
[null,null,"Autore",null,"Keen Michael"]
[null,null,"Titolo",null,"Optimal Tax Administration / / Michael Keen, Joel Slemrod"]
[null,null,"Pubbl/distr/stampa",null,"Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2017"]
[null,null,"ISBN",null,"9781475570304"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1475570309"]
[{"$nulls":4},"9781475570373"]
[{"$nulls":4},"1475570376"]
[null,null,"Descrizione fisica",null,"1 online resource (28 pages) : illustrations (some color), graphs, tables"]
[null,null,"Collana",null,"IMF Working Papers"]
[null,null,"Disciplina",null,"336.2"]
[null,null,"Soggetti",null,"Tax administration and procedure"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxpayer compliance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Macroeconomics"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public Finance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Efficiency"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Optimal Taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Tax Evasion and Avoidance"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Public finance & taxation"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Personal income"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Tax gap"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Tax administration core functions"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Compliance costs"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Revenue administration"]
[{"$nulls":4},"National accounts"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Revenue performance assessment"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Income"]
[{"$nulls":4},"Revenue"]
[{"$nulls":4},"United States"]
[null,null,"Lingua di pubblicazione",null,"Inglese"]
[null,null,"Formato",null,"Materiale a stampa"]
[null,null,null,"Livello bibliografico","Monografia"]
[null,null,null,"Nota di bibliografia","Includes bibliographical references."]
[null,null,null,"Sommario/riassunto","This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one  that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about  optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact  of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient  statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable  income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are  characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the  optimal compliance gap."]