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Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited : : New Theory and New Evidence / / Gianni De Nicolo, Abu M. Jalal, John Boyd



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Autore: De Nicolo Gianni Visualizza persona
Titolo: Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited : : New Theory and New Evidence / / Gianni De Nicolo, Abu M. Jalal, John Boyd Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (51 p.)
Soggetto topico: Bank failures - Econometric models
Competition - Econometric models
Bank loans - Econometric models
Risk - Econometric models
Banking
Banks and Banking
Banks and banking
Banks
Bonds
Capital and Ownership Structure
Competition
Depository Institutions
Econometric analysis
Econometric models
Econometrics & economic statistics
Econometrics
Estimation techniques
Estimation
Finance
Finance: General
Financial institutions
Financial markets
Financial Risk and Risk Management
Financing Policy
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Goodwill
Income
Industries: Financial Services
Investment & securities
Investments: Bonds
Loans
Macroeconomics
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
National accounts
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Personal income
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Value of Firms
Soggetto geografico: United States
Altri autori: BoydJohn  
JalalAbu M  
Note generali: "December 2006."
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 48-49).
Nota di contenuto: ""Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited: New Theory and New Evidence""; ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THEORY""; ""III. EVIDENCE""; ""IV. CONCLUSION""; ""Appendix I. Pareto Dominant Equilibria""; ""References""
Sommario/riassunto: This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.
Titolo autorizzato: Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-4777-0
1-4527-7939-2
1-283-45039-9
9786613823663
1-4519-1010-X
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910809283803321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2006/297