06260oam 22015014 450 991080928380332120240410162252.01-4623-4777-01-4527-7939-21-283-45039-997866138236631-4519-1010-X(CKB)3360000000443362(EBL)3012548(SSID)ssj0001323906(PQKBManifestationID)11978484(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001323906(PQKBWorkID)11505603(PQKB)10456336(OCoLC)568151313(MiAaPQ)EBC3012548(IMF)WPIEE2006297(EXLCZ)99336000000044336220020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrBank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited : New Theory and New Evidence /Gianni De Nicolo, Abu M. Jalal, John Boyd1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (51 p.)IMF Working Papers"December 2006."1-4518-6557-0 Includes bibliographical references (p. 48-49).""Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited: New Theory and New Evidence""; ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THEORY""; ""III. EVIDENCE""; ""IV. CONCLUSION""; ""Appendix I. Pareto Dominant Equilibria""; ""References""This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/297Bank failuresEconometric modelsCompetitionEconometric modelsBank loansEconometric modelsRiskEconometric modelsBanks and BankingimfFinance: GeneralimfInvestments: BondsimfMacroeconomicsimfIndustries: Financial ServicesimfEconometricsimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfFinancing PolicyimfFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementimfCapital and Ownership StructureimfValue of FirmsimfGoodwillimfOligopoly and Other Imperfect MarketsimfGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)imfPersonal Income, Wealth, and Their DistributionsimfEstimationimfBankingimfFinanceimfInvestment & securitiesimfEconometrics & economic statisticsimfLoansimfBondsimfCompetitionimfPersonal incomeimfFinancial institutionsimfNational accountsimfFinancial marketsimfEstimation techniquesimfEconometric analysisimfBanks and bankingimfIncomeimfEconometric modelsimfUnited StatesimfBank failuresEconometric models.CompetitionEconometric models.Bank loansEconometric models.RiskEconometric models.Banks and BankingFinance: GeneralInvestments: BondsMacroeconomicsIndustries: Financial ServicesEconometricsBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesFinancing PolicyFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementCapital and Ownership StructureValue of FirmsGoodwillOligopoly and Other Imperfect MarketsGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)Personal Income, Wealth, and Their DistributionsEstimationBankingFinanceInvestment & securitiesEconometrics & economic statisticsLoansBondsCompetitionPersonal incomeFinancial institutionsNational accountsFinancial marketsEstimation techniquesEconometric analysisBanks and bankingIncomeEconometric modelsDe Nicolo Gianni375199Jalal Abu M1630702Boyd John341064International Monetary Fund.Research Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910809283803321Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited3969147UNINA