Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy / / by Andreas Vrahimis

• Autore: Vrahimis Andreas
• Pubblicazione: Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2022
• Edizione: 1st ed. 2022.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (402 pages)
• Disciplina: 194
• Soggetto topico: Analysis (Philosophy); Philosophy, Modern - 20th century; Continental Philosophy; Analytic Philosophy; Philosophy of the 20th century
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: 1 Introduction -- Bibliography -- 2 Prelude: Bergsonism and Anglophone Analytic Philosophy -- 2.1 Before Stardom -- 2.2 Bergsonism in Britain and America -- 2.3 Stebbing’s Response to Bergson’s 1911 Lectures -- 2.4 Russell Meets Bergson -- 2.5 Costelloe-Stephen’s Response to Russell -- Bibliography -- 3 Henri Bergson: A Misunderstood Celebrity -- 3.1 Bergson’s Historical Background -- Spiritualism in Mid-Nineteenth-Century French Philosophy -- ‘Spiritualist Positivism’ -- 3.2 A Biological Epistemology of Perception -- 3.3 Memory and Recognition -- 3.4 Intellect and Intuition -- 3.5 Philosophy of Space and Time -- Beyond Spencer’s Evolutionary Epistemology -- Number, Quantity, and Space -- Durée -- 3.6 Science and Metaphysics -- 3.7 Language -- Bibliography -- 4 William James and the Anglophone Reception of Bergsonism -- 4.1 A Philosophical Friendship -- 4.2 The Portrait of a Maître -- 4.3 Intellectualism -- 4.4 Bergson’s Radical Empiricism? -- 4.5 Radical Empiricism Versus Absolute Idealism -- 4.6 James’s Influence on Bergson’s Analytic Critics -- Bibliography -- 5 ‘Ants, bees, and Bergson’: Bertrand Russell’s Polemic -- 5.1 Contra Anti-intellectualism -- 5.2 Number and Space -- 5.3 Zeno’s Paradoxes -- Zeno’s and Bergson’s Solutions -- Russell’s Mathematical Solution -- Russell’s Objection to Bergson’s Solution, and the Debate with Carr -- 5.4 Time and Memory -- 5.5 Perception and the Subject-Object Distinction -- 5.6 Russell’s Later Responses to Bergson -- ‘Jupiter sometimes nods’ -- ‘Evolutionism’ and Scientific Philosophy -- Bergson’s Place in the History of Philosophy -- Bibliography -- 6 ‘Analytic’ and ‘Synthetic’ Philosophy: Karin Costelloe-Stephen’s Defences of Bergson -- 6.1 Mereology -- 6.2 Recognition, Acquaintance, and the Limits of Thought -- 6.3 Costelloe-Stephen’s Reply to Russell -- Space -- Mathematical Continua and Processes of Change -- 6.4 Complexes and Syntheses -- 6.5 Russell’s Response to Costelloe-Stephen -- 6.6 Analytic Versus Continental ‘Synthetic’ Philosophy -- Bibliography -- 7 A Call for Moderation: L. Susan Stebbing’s Critique of Bergson -- 7.1 How to Avoid Russell’s Errors -- 7.2 Bergson’s Historical Context -- 7.3 Bergson Versus the Pragmatists on Truth -- 7.4 ‘Anti-intellectualism’ -- 7.5 Intuition and Argumentation -- 7.6 Stebbing’s Objections to Bergson’s Epistemology and Theory of Truth -- 7.7 Costelloe-Stephen’s Answer to Stebbing’s Objection -- Bibliography -- 8 Entr’acte: Bergson’s Germanophone Reception and the Rise of Lebensphilosophie -- 8.1 The Philosophers’ Great War -- 8.2 The Demise of Bergsonism -- 8.3 The Rise of Lebensphilosophie -- 8.4 The Vienna Circle’s Opposition to Lebensphilosophie -- 8.5 Neurath’s Russellian Critique of Spengler -- Bibliography -- 9 Evolutionary Epistemology: Moritz Schlick’s Critique of Intuition -- 9.1 Anti-biologism -- 9.2 Schlick’s Naturalised Epistemology -- 9.3 ‘Intuitive Knowledge’: A Contradiction in Terms -- 9.4 Images and Concepts -- 9.5 Judgements and Coordination -- 9.6 Philosophy’s ‘Great Error’ Revisited -- Bibliography -- 10 From the Critique of Intuition to Overcoming Metaphysics: Schlick’s Dialogue with Carnap -- 10.1 Schlick on Intuition and Metaphysics -- 10.2 Carnap on Implicit Definitions and Structure Descriptions -- 10.3 Carnap’s Critique of Bergson -- 10.4 Schlick’s Answer to Carnap -- 10.5 Schlick’s Critique of Russellian Acquaintance -- Bibliography -- 11 Different Kinds of Nothing -- 11.1 Carnap and Neurath Shift Their Target -- 11.2 Carnap on Heidegger’s Pseudo-statements -- 11.3 Carnap’s Response to Lebensphilosophie -- 11.4 Bergson and Carnap on Pseudo-problems About Nothing -- 11.5 Heidegger’s Angst Versus Bergson’s Disinterested Intuition -- 11.6 Sartre Responds to Bergson and Heidegger -- 11.7 Ayer Contra Sartre on Nothing and Negation -- Bibliography -- 12 Doing Without Masters: Oxford Philosophy and the Analytic-Continental Divide -- 12.1 Ayer Revives Russell -- 12.2 Ryle Against the 1953 UNESCO Report -- 12.3 R.M. Hare’s Proposal for the Institutional Reform of Continental Philosophy -- 12.4 Ryle Against Continental ‘Fuehrership’ -- Bibliography -- 13 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.
• Sommario/riassunto: During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Henri Bergson became an international celebrity, profoundly influencing contemporary intellectual and artistic currents. While Bergsonism was fashionable, L. Susan Stebbing, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap launched different critical attacks against some of Bergson’s views. This book examines this series of critical responses to Bergsonism early in the history of analytic philosophy. Analytic criticisms of Bergsonism were influenced by William James, who saw Bergson as an ‘anti-intellectualist’ ally of American Pragmatism, and Max Scheler, who saw him as a prophet of Lebensphilosophie. Some of the main analytic objections to Bergson are answered in the work of Karin Costelloe-Stephen. Analytic anti-Bergsonism accompanied the earlier refutations of idealism by Russell and Moore, and later influenced the Vienna Circle’s critique of metaphysics. It eventually contributed to the formation of the view that ‘analytic’ philosophy is divided from its ‘continental’ counterpart.
• Titolo autorizzato: Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy
• ISBN: 9783030807559; 9783030807542
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910583501503321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: History of Analytic Philosophy, . 2634-6001