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Autore: | Tye Michael |
Titolo: | Consciousness revisited [[electronic resource] ] : materialism without phenomenal concepts / / Michael Tye |
Pubblicazione: | Cambridge, MA, : MIT Press, c2009 |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (xiv, 229 p.) |
Disciplina: | 126 |
Soggetto topico: | Consciousness |
Phenomenology | |
Materialism | |
Note generali: | "A Bradford book." |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-225) and index. |
Nota di contenuto: | Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism. |
Sommario/riassunto: | We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more. |
Titolo autorizzato: | Consciousness revisited |
ISBN: | 1-282-24013-7 |
0-262-25517-0 | |
9786612240133 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910808383603321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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