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Titolo	Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts // Michael Tye
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge, MA, : MIT Press, c2009
ISBN	1-282-24013-7 0-262-25517-0 9786612240133
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (xiv, 229 p.)
Collana	Representation and mind
Disciplina	126
Soggetti	Consciousness Phenomenology Materialism
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	"A Bradford book."
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-225) and index.
Nota di contenuto	Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part

I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II --  
Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles  
-- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory  
gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change  
blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the  
change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and  
the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A  
further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall --  
Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat  
to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social  
externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged  
access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? --  
Phenomenal externalism.

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Sommario/riassunto

We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who  
have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just  
a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more.

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