Vai al contenuto principale della pagina

The Political Economy of Revenue-Forecasting Experience From Low-Income Countries / / Stephan Danninger, Annette Kyobe, M. Cangiano



(Visualizza in formato marc)    (Visualizza in BIBFRAME)

Autore: Danninger Stephan Visualizza persona
Titolo: The Political Economy of Revenue-Forecasting Experience From Low-Income Countries / / Stephan Danninger, Annette Kyobe, M. Cangiano Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2005
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (34 p.)
Soggetto topico: Capital movements
Electronic books. -- local
Financial crises
Lenders of last resort
Liquidity (Economics)
Political Science
Law, Politics & Government
Public Finance
Budgeting
Taxation
Criminology
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
National Budget
Budget Systems
Bureaucracy
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations
Corruption
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
Public finance & taxation
Budgeting & financial management
Corporate crime
white-collar crime
Revenue forecasting
Budget planning and preparation
Revenue administration
Expenditure
Tax policy
Public financial management (PFM)
Crime
Tax administration and procedure
Budget
Revenue
Expenditures, Public
Soggetto geografico: United States
Altri autori: KyobeAnnette  
CangianoM  
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. VARIETIES OF COUNTRY INSURANCE""; ""A. Capital Controls""; ""B. Self-Insurance""; ""C. Private Insurance""; ""D. IMF-Led Packages""; ""E. Regional Swap Agreements""; ""III. A NEW COUNTRY INSURANCE FACILITY""; ""A. Eligibility Criteria""; ""B. Interest Rate""; ""C. Duration""; ""D. Size""; ""E. Procedures""; ""F. The Exit Problem""; ""IV. FINAL REMARKS""
Sommario/riassunto: This paper analyzes interference and timeliness in the revenue-forecasting process, using new data on revenue-forecasting practices in low-income countries. Interference is defined as the occurrence of a significant deviation from purely technical forecasts. A theoretical model explains forecasting interference through government corruption. The data broadly supports the model, and the results are robust to alternative explanations. The paper also constructs three indices-transparency, formality, and organizational simplicity-that characterize revenue-forecasting practices, and assesses their effectiveness in producing an upfront-that is, timely-budget envelope. More transparent and simple forecasting processes lead to early budget constraints, while formality has no measurable effect.
Titolo autorizzato: The Political Economy of Revenue-Forecasting Experience From Low-Income Countries  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-1251-9
1-4527-8549-X
1-282-04589-X
1-4519-0557-2
9786613797674
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910788518103321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2005/002