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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910639301203321 |
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Autore |
Unger, Joseph |
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Titolo |
Das osterreichische Erbrecht : systematisch dargestellt / von Joseph Unger |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Leipzig, : Breitkopf und Hartel, 1871 |
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Edizione |
[2. durchgesehene Aufl] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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Disciplina |
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Locazione |
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Collocazione |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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2. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788518103321 |
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Autore |
Danninger Stephan |
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Titolo |
The Political Economy of Revenue-Forecasting Experience From Low-Income Countries / / Stephan Danninger, Annette Kyobe, M. Cangiano |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2005 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-1251-9 |
1-4527-8549-X |
1-282-04589-X |
1-4519-0557-2 |
9786613797674 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (34 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Capital movements |
Electronic books. -- local |
Financial crises |
Lenders of last resort |
Liquidity (Economics) |
Political Science |
Law, Politics & Government |
Public Finance |
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Budgeting |
Taxation |
Criminology |
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General |
National Budget |
Budget Systems |
Bureaucracy |
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations |
Corruption |
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General |
Public finance & taxation |
Budgeting & financial management |
Corporate crime |
white-collar crime |
Revenue forecasting |
Budget planning and preparation |
Revenue administration |
Expenditure |
Tax policy |
Public financial management (PFM) |
Crime |
Tax administration and procedure |
Budget |
Revenue |
Expenditures, Public |
United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. VARIETIES OF COUNTRY INSURANCE""; ""A. Capital Controls""; ""B. Self-Insurance""; ""C. Private Insurance""; ""D. IMF-Led Packages""; ""E. Regional Swap Agreements""; ""III. A NEW COUNTRY INSURANCE FACILITY""; ""A. Eligibility Criteria""; ""B. Interest Rate""; ""C. Duration""; ""D. Size""; ""E. Procedures""; ""F. The Exit Problem""; ""IV. FINAL REMARKS"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper analyzes interference and timeliness in the revenue-forecasting process, using new data on revenue-forecasting practices in low-income countries. Interference is defined as the occurrence of a significant deviation from purely technical forecasts. A theoretical model explains forecasting interference through government corruption. The data broadly supports the model, and the results are robust to alternative explanations. The paper also constructs three indices-transparency, formality, and organizational simplicity-that characterize revenue-forecasting practices, and assesses their effectiveness in producing an upfront-that is, timely-budget envelope. More transparent and simple forecasting processes lead to early budget constraints, while formality has no measurable effect. |
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