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Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk : : A General Equilibrium Exposition / / Gianni De Nicolo, Marcella Lucchetta



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Autore: De Nicolo Gianni Visualizza persona
Titolo: Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk : : A General Equilibrium Exposition / / Gianni De Nicolo, Marcella Lucchetta Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (31 p.)
Soggetto topico: Intermediation (Finance)
Competition
Banks and Banking
Econometrics
Finance: General
Labor
Banks
Depository Institutions
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Labor Demand
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
Banking
Finance
Labour
income economics
Econometrics & economic statistics
Moral hazard
Self-employment
General equilibrium models
Banks and banking
Financial risk management
Self-employed
Econometric models
Altri autori: LucchettaMarcella  
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; A. Time, Endowments and Preferences; B. Technologies; C. Contracts and Information; III. Equilibrium with Banks and Depositors; A. Moral Hazard; B. No Moral Hazard; IV. Optimality and Intermediary Rents; V. Equilibrium with Firms, Intermediaries and Depositors; A. The Extended Model; B. Perfectly Correlated Projects; C. Independent Projects; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References
Sommario/riassunto: We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically relevant, and demonstrate the need of general equilibrium modeling to design financial policies aimed at attaining socially optimal levels of systemic risk in the economy.
Titolo autorizzato: Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-6889-1
1-4527-8538-4
1-4518-7252-6
9786612843204
1-282-84320-6
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910788335503321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2009/105