LEADER 04940oam 22011654 450 001 9910788335503321 005 20230721045657.0 010 $a1-4623-6889-1 010 $a1-4527-8538-4 010 $a1-4518-7252-6 010 $a9786612843204 010 $a1-282-84320-6 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055261 035 $a(EBL)1608284 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940810 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11528535 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940810 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10955754 035 $a(PQKB)10049287 035 $a(OCoLC)645463594 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608284 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009105 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055261 100 $a20020129d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFinancial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk : $eA General Equilibrium Exposition /$fGianni De Nicolo, Marcella Lucchetta 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2009. 215 $a1 online resource (31 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1682-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aTable of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; A. Time, Endowments and Preferences; B. Technologies; C. Contracts and Information; III. Equilibrium with Banks and Depositors; A. Moral Hazard; B. No Moral Hazard; IV. Optimality and Intermediary Rents; V. Equilibrium with Firms, Intermediaries and Depositors; A. The Extended Model; B. Perfectly Correlated Projects; C. Independent Projects; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References 330 3 $aWe study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically relevant, and demonstrate the need of general equilibrium modeling to design financial policies aimed at attaining socially optimal levels of systemic risk in the economy. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2009/105 606 $aIntermediation (Finance) 606 $aCompetition 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aEconometrics$2imf 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aLabor$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aLabor Demand$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)$2imf 606 $aComputable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models$2imf 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aLabour$2imf 606 $aincome economics$2imf 606 $aEconometrics & economic statistics$2imf 606 $aMoral hazard$2imf 606 $aSelf-employment$2imf 606 $aCompetition$2imf 606 $aGeneral equilibrium models$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 606 $aFinancial risk management$2imf 606 $aSelf-employed$2imf 606 $aEconometric models$2imf 615 0$aIntermediation (Finance) 615 0$aCompetition. 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aEconometrics 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aLabor 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aLabor Demand 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) 615 7$aComputable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aLabour 615 7$aincome economics 615 7$aEconometrics & economic statistics 615 7$aMoral hazard 615 7$aSelf-employment 615 7$aCompetition 615 7$aGeneral equilibrium models 615 7$aBanks and banking 615 7$aFinancial risk management 615 7$aSelf-employed 615 7$aEconometric models 700 $aDe Nicolo$b Gianni$0375199 701 $aLucchetta$b Marcella$01472689 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788335503321 996 $aFinancial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk$93685560 997 $aUNINA