The impression of influence : legislator communication, representation, and democratic accountability / / Justin Grimmer, Sean J. Westwood, and Solomon Messing

• Autore: Grimmer Justin
• Pubblicazione: Princeton, New Jersey ; ; Oxfordshire, England : , : Princeton University Press, , 2015; ©2015
• Edizione: Pilot project. eBook available to selected US libraries only
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (221 pages) : illustrations, tables
• Disciplina: 328.73
• Soggetto topico: Legislators - United States - Public opinion; Government spending policy - United States - Public opinion; Communication in politics - United States
• Soggetto non controllato: Obama administration; Republican activists; Tea Party movement; Text as Data; accountability; antispending rhetoric; appropriations process; budget criticism; bureaucrats; congressional credit claiming; credit allocation; credit claiming messages; credit claiming; credit-claiming messages; credit-claiming rates; credit-claiming strategies; credit; deception; democracy; democratic competence; expenditure; federal expenditures; federal funds; federal spending; government spending; grant decisions; hand-coded documents; hand-coded labels; influence; legislators; linguistic deception; name recognition; nonpartisan reputation; particularistic projects; partisan reputation; personal vote; political representation; press releases; spending; statistical modeling; systematic deception; transparent communication
• Persona (resp. second.): WestwoodSean J.; MessingSolomon
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Representation, Spending, and the Personal Vote -- 2. Solving the Representative's Problem and Creating the Representative's Opportunity -- 3. How Legislators Create an Impression of Influence -- 4. Creating an Impression, Not Just Increasing Name Recognition -- 5. Cultivating an Impression of Influence with Actions and Small Expenditures -- 6. Credit, Deception, and Institutional Design -- 7. Criticism and Credit: How Deficit Implications Undermine Credit Allocation -- 8. Representation and the Impression of Influence -- 9. Text as Data: Methods Appendix -- Bibliography -- Index
• Sommario/riassunto: Constituents often fail to hold their representatives accountable for federal spending decisions-even though those very choices have a pervasive influence on American life. Why does this happen? Breaking new ground in the study of representation, The Impression of Influence demonstrates how legislators skillfully inform constituents with strategic communication and how this facilitates or undermines accountability. Using a massive collection of Congressional texts and innovative experiments and methods, the book shows how legislators create an impression of influence through credit claiming messages.Anticipating constituents' reactions, legislators claim credit for programs that elicit a positive response, making constituents believe their legislator is effectively representing their district. This spurs legislators to create and defend projects popular with their constituents. Yet legislators claim credit for much more-they announce projects long before they begin, deceptively imply they deserve credit for expenditures they had little role in securing, and boast about minuscule projects. Unfortunately, legislators get away with seeking credit broadly because constituents evaluate the actions that are reported, rather than the size of the expenditures.The Impression of Influence raises critical questions about how citizens hold their political representatives accountable and when deception is allowable in a democracy.
• Titolo autorizzato: The impression of influence
• ISBN: 0-691-16262-X; 1-4008-5266-8
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910788088703321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II