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A behavioral theory of elections [[electronic resource] /] / Jonathan Bendor ... [et al.]



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Autore: Bendor Jonathan B Visualizza persona
Titolo: A behavioral theory of elections [[electronic resource] /] / Jonathan Bendor ... [et al.] Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c2011
Edizione: Course Book
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (264 p.)
Disciplina: 324.9001/9
Soggetto topico: Elections
Voting - Psychological aspects
Behaviorism (Political science)
Soggetto genere / forma: Electronic books.
Soggetto non controllato: Condorcet winner
Downsian party competition
Duverger's Law
Markov chain
Pareto dominance
adaptation
aspiration-based adaptation
aspiration-based adaptive rule
aspiration-based adjustment
aspirations
bandwagon effect
behavior
behavioral theory
bounded rationality
candidates
computational model
decision making
election voting
elections
equilibrium behavior
faction size
framing
game-theoretic model
hedonics
heuristics
incumbent
majority faction
multiparty elections
parties
party affiliation
party competition
payoffs
platforms
political parties
politicians
population size
propensity
rational choice theory
rational choice
rationality
retrospective voting
satisficing
search behavior
stochastic process
turnout
two-party elections
voter choice
voter coordination
voter participation
voter turnout
voters
Persona (resp. second.): DiermeierDaniel
SiegelDavid A.
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto: Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter One. Bounded Rationality and Elections -- Chapter Two. Aspiration-based Adaptive Rules -- Chapter Three. Party Competition -- Chapter Four. Turnout -- Chapter Five. Voter Choice -- Chapter Six. An Integrated Model of Two-Party Elections -- Chapter Seven. Elections with Multiple Parties -- Chapter Eight. Conclusions: Bounded Rationality and Elections -- Appendix A. Proofs -- Appendix B. The Computational Model -- Bibliography -- Index
Sommario/riassunto: Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. While these formulations produce many insights, they also generate anomalies--most famously, about turnout. The rise of behavioral economics has posed new challenges to the premise of rationality. This groundbreaking book provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors--politicians as well as voters--are only boundedly rational. The theory posits learning via trial and error: actions that surpass an actor's aspiration level are more likely to be used in the future, while those that fall short are less likely to be tried later. Based on this idea of adaptation, the authors construct formal models of party competition, turnout, and voters' choices of candidates. These models predict substantial turnout levels, voters sorting into parties, and winning parties adopting centrist platforms. In multiparty elections, voters are able to coordinate vote choices on majority-preferred candidates, while all candidates garner significant vote shares. Overall, the behavioral theory and its models produce macroimplications consistent with the data on elections, and they use plausible microassumptions about the cognitive capacities of politicians and voters. A computational model accompanies the book and can be used as a tool for further research.
Titolo autorizzato: A behavioral theory of elections  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-283-16374-8
9786613163745
1-4008-3680-8
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910456795203321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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