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The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises / / Luc Laeven, Fabian Valencia



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Autore: Laeven Luc Visualizza persona
Titolo: The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises / / Luc Laeven, Fabian Valencia Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (45 pages) : illustrations, tables
Disciplina: 332.1
Soggetto topico: Bank failures
Financial crises
Moral hazard
Deposit insurance
Bank resolution
Banking
Banks and Banking
Banks and banking
Banks
Blanket guarantee
Crisis management
Depository Institutions
Economic & financial crises & disasters
Economics
Exports and Imports
Finance
Finance: General
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Financial Risk Management
Foreign liabilities
International economics
International Investment
Investment Decisions
Investments, Foreign
Liquidity
Long-term Capital Movements
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
Portfolio Choice
Soggetto geografico: Turkey
Altri autori: ValenciaFabian  
Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Country Experiences -- III. Effectiveness of Blanket Guarantees -- A. Empirical Analysis -- IV. The Costs of Using Blanket Guarantees -- V. Policy Implications -- VI. Conclusions -- Tables -- 1. Selected Blanket Guarantee Episodes -- 2. Selected Bank-Specific Guarantee Announcements -- 3. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Liquidity Support -- 4. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effects of Guarantees on Liquidity Support -- 5. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities -- 6. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effect of Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities -- 7. Blanket Guarantee and Extensive Liquidity Support -- 8. Blanket Guarantees, Crisis Intensity, and Fiscal Costs -- A1. Sequence of Events in Selected Crisis Episodes -- A2. IMF Programs and Bank Restructuring Policies -- Figures -- 1. Effectiveness of Depositors' Guarantees in Selected Countries -- 2. Fiscal Costs and Blanket Guarantees -- 3. Crisis Intensity and Blanket Guarantees -- References.
Sommario/riassunto: In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring programs and may increase moral hazard going forward. Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe.
Titolo autorizzato: The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 9786612842016
9781462393121
1462393128
9781282842014
1282842013
9781451871081
1451871082
9781452745039
145274503X
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910965940603321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2008/250