05987oam 22013334 450 991096594060332120250426110849.097866128420169781462393121146239312897812828420141282842013978145187108114518710829781452745039145274503X(CKB)3170000000055145(SSID)ssj0001488770(PQKBManifestationID)11995298(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001488770(PQKBWorkID)11463816(PQKB)10255187(OCoLC)460638675(IMF)WPIEE2008250(MiAaPQ)EBC1586707(IMF)WPIEA2008250WPIEA2008250(EXLCZ)99317000000005514520020129d2008 uf 0engurcnu||||||||txtccrThe Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises /Luc Laeven, Fabian Valencia1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (45 pages) illustrations, tablesIMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/250Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph9781451915617 1451915616 Includes bibliographical references.Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Country Experiences -- III. Effectiveness of Blanket Guarantees -- A. Empirical Analysis -- IV. The Costs of Using Blanket Guarantees -- V. Policy Implications -- VI. Conclusions -- Tables -- 1. Selected Blanket Guarantee Episodes -- 2. Selected Bank-Specific Guarantee Announcements -- 3. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Liquidity Support -- 4. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effects of Guarantees on Liquidity Support -- 5. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities -- 6. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effect of Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities -- 7. Blanket Guarantee and Extensive Liquidity Support -- 8. Blanket Guarantees, Crisis Intensity, and Fiscal Costs -- A1. Sequence of Events in Selected Crisis Episodes -- A2. IMF Programs and Bank Restructuring Policies -- Figures -- 1. Effectiveness of Depositors' Guarantees in Selected Countries -- 2. Fiscal Costs and Blanket Guarantees -- 3. Crisis Intensity and Blanket Guarantees -- References.In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring programs and may increase moral hazard going forward. Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/250Bank failuresFinancial crisesMoral hazardDeposit insuranceBank resolutionimfBankingimfBanks and BankingimfBanks and bankingimfBanksimfBlanket guaranteeimfCrisis managementimfDepository InstitutionsimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfEconomicsimfExports and ImportsimfFinanceimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfForeign liabilitiesimfInternational economicsimfInternational InvestmentimfInvestment DecisionsimfInvestments, ForeignimfLiquidityimfLong-term Capital MovementsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfPortfolio ChoiceimfTurkeyimfBank failures.Financial crises.Moral hazard.Deposit insurance.Bank resolutionBankingBanks and BankingBanks and bankingBanksBlanket guaranteeCrisis managementDepository InstitutionsEconomic & financial crises & disastersEconomicsExports and ImportsFinanceFinance: GeneralFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationFinancial Risk ManagementForeign liabilitiesInternational economicsInternational InvestmentInvestment DecisionsInvestments, ForeignLiquidityLong-term Capital MovementsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesPortfolio Choice332.1Laeven Luc1795065Valencia Fabian1815695DcWaIMFBOOK9910965940603321The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises4371697UNINA