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A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries / / Luc Leruth, Elisabeth Paul



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Autore: Leruth Luc Visualizza persona
Titolo: A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries / / Luc Leruth, Elisabeth Paul Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (45 p.)
Soggetto topico: Government spending policy - Management - Developing countries
Expenditures, Public - Developing countries
Public Finance
Taxation
Auditing
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
Public Administration
Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Management accounting & bookkeeping
Public finance & taxation
Expenditure
External audit
Internal controls
Tax incentives
Expenditures, Public
Revenue
Soggetto geografico: France
Altri autori: PaulElisabeth  
Note generali: "September 2006."
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. INTERPRETATION OF PEM UNDER THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY""; ""III. THE BASIC MODEL ""; ""IV. EX POST AUDITS""; ""V. EX ANTE CONTROLS""; ""VI. CONCLUSION""; ""REFERENCES""
Sommario/riassunto: A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems, and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, we analyze the benefits derived from the use by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of two control instruments; ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. We derive a set of possible "control regimes" which can be used by the MoF. Although we illustrate the use of the model using developing countries, it is also relevant to developed economies.
Titolo autorizzato: A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-8814-0
1-4519-8834-6
1-283-51214-9
1-4519-9323-4
9786613824592
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910826875903321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2006/204