1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910826875903321

Autore

Leruth Luc

Titolo

A principal-agent theory approach to public expenditure management systems in developing countries / / prepared by Luc Leruth and Elisabeth Paul

Pubbl/distr/stampa

[Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2006

ISBN

1-4623-8814-0

1-4519-8834-6

1-283-51214-9

1-4519-9323-4

9786613824592

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (45 p.)

Collana

IMF working paper ; ; WP/06/204

Altri autori (Persone)

PaulElisabeth

Soggetti

Government spending policy - Management - Developing countries

Expenditures, Public - Developing countries

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

"September 2006."

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. INTERPRETATION OF PEM UNDER THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY""; ""III. THE BASIC MODEL ""; ""IV. EX POST AUDITS""; ""V. EX ANTE CONTROLS""; ""VI. CONCLUSION""; ""REFERENCES""

Sommario/riassunto

A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems, and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, we analyze the benefits derived from the use by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of two control instruments; ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. We derive a set of possible "control regimes" which can be used by the MoF. Although we illustrate the use of the model using developing countries, it is also relevant to developed economies.