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Autore: |
Messmacher Miguel
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Titolo: |
Sovereign Insurance and Program Design : : What is Optimal for the Sovereign? / / Miguel Messmacher
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Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (30 p.) |
Soggetto topico: | Insurance - Econometric models |
Moral hazard - Econometric models | |
International finance - Econometric models | |
Finance: General | |
Insurance | |
Macroeconomics | |
Taxation | |
Industries: Financial Services | |
International Economic Order and Integration | |
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions | |
International Lending and Debt Problems | |
International Policy Coordination and Transmission | |
Insurance Companies | |
Actuarial Studies | |
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation | |
Pension Funds | |
Non-bank Financial Institutions | |
Financial Instruments | |
Institutional Investors | |
Macroeconomics: Consumption | |
Saving | |
Wealth | |
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General | |
Finance | |
Insurance & actuarial studies | |
Public finance & taxation | |
Moral hazard | |
Insurance companies | |
Consumption | |
Tax incentives | |
Financial risk management | |
Economics | |
Note generali: | "March 2006." |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
Nota di contenuto: | ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE""; ""III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE""; ""IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER""; ""V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS""; ""REFERENCES"" |
Sommario/riassunto: | The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; ii) the premium increases with the sovereign's incentive to take risks; iii) a deductible is chosen to limit moral hazard; iv) the deductible-to-support ratio is decreasing with the size of the realized shock; and v) the change in the choice of savings when insurance is available is ambiguous, as there is a trade-off between inducing higher effort and increasing the likelihood of default. |
Titolo autorizzato: | Sovereign Insurance and Program Design ![]() |
ISBN: | 1-4623-1248-9 |
1-4527-8647-X | |
1-283-51558-X | |
1-4519-0860-1 | |
9786613828033 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910788406203321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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